Dan L. Hargrove
Throughout its history, the United States has opposed a standing professional military. Instead, our nation has structured its armed forces so that our national security heavily relies upon reservists, particularly after Vietnam. Since 9/11 alone, nearly 200,000 reservists have been mobilized, with thousands more expected to be so. And many of those reservists who completed their initial mobilization were later remobilized for a second time. In a dramatic departure from the past, the Defense Department has begun deploying Guardsman to such places as the Balkans, the Sinai, Iraq, and almost everywhere else the regular forces go.
Marc Betinsky
Consider the following situation: An employee anticipates that his employment is about to be terminated, for what he believes to be discriminatory or otherwise unlawful reasons. After consulting with an attorney, he decides to tape-record conversations with his supervisors, in the hopes of recording a "smoking gun" comment. A short time later, the employee is terminated, and he later commences litigation in federal court against his employer.
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ALM Staff
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National cases of interest to your practice.
Jason S. Aschenbrand
Faced with hefty legal bills, damage awards, or settlements as a result of discrimination or harassment claims, employers have attempted to recover costs from third parties whom they perceive as causing or sharing responsibility for the problem. To this end, employers have sued unions and even their own employees in an effort to spread the financial responsibility. The theories behind such suits, and their results, have been mixed.
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Recent rulings of interest to your practice.
ALM Staff
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National rulings of interest to you and your practice.
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Robert P. Lewis
At the conclusion of its most recent 2002-2003 term, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision clarifying plaintiffs' standard of proof in "mixed-motive" employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In <i>Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa</i>, the Court held that a plaintiff is required to prove by direct evidence that an unlawful factor was a "motivating factor" in the challenged adverse employment action. Instead, a plaintiff can prove his or her discrimination claim in a mixed-motive case by circumstantial evidence. As a result of this decision, defendants will find it more difficult to obtain summary judgment dismissing mixed-motive discrimination cases prior to trial, the result of which will be that more such cases will be subjected to the uncertainties of jury trials.
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Scott Edward Cole
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Matthew R. Bainer
Last month, we introduced our primer on the "leniency" standard for FLSA actions, and its interplay with Rule 23 guidelines. We called the quest for class certification "the most feared battle waged in litigation," and went on to explain that if well-regarded class action practitioners were surveyed, there would almost assuredly be a consensus that the quest for class certification is exactly that to a targeted defendant.We discussed the FLSA's opt-in burden, and the liberal standard in our previous article. This month, we address the seemingly irreconcilable approaches taken by some courts.
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Reviews of recent rulings that affect your practice.
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Geoffrey A. Mort
Plaintiffs' employment lawyers contemplating bringing Title VII or other discrimination suits have long felt secure in the knowledge that, even if they lose at trial or at the summary judgment stage, their client will not be assessed attorney's fees. Any ambiguity regarding the meaning of a "prevailing party" entitled to fees under the Federal Rules was resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC</i>, 434 U.S. 412 (1977). The Supreme Court denied fees to the prevailing defendant employer in that Title VII case, pointing out that the EEOC's actions in bringing the case could not be characterized as without merit or unreasonable. Is that still the case?
