Bankruptcy offers an attractive platform for the sale of assets because it is injected with a statutory prerogative allowing for the clearance of third- party interests. Specifically, ' 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the sale of bankruptcy estate property 'free and clear of any interest [of any other entity] in such property' provided that certain conditions are satisfied. Notwithstanding that grant of authority, however, the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically define the phrase 'any interest in such property' or otherwise specify the scope of interests that the phrase is intended to cover.

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The use of bankruptcy to protect an individual's home from foreclosure is sufficiently commonplace that practitioners would be well advised to understand the foreclosure process in their state and, in particular, when that process will be deemed completed for purposes of section 1322. This article explains why.

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Troubled businesses also may have turned to the distressed debt market instead of filing for bankruptcy protection due to recent changes to the Bankruptcy Code, which made bankruptcy a more complicated, expensive and uncertain alternative. As a result, when the next wave of Chapter 11 filings comes, hedge funds and other distressed debt investors will act to protect their unique interests and strategies, which will bring new dynamics to bankruptcy cases.

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News about lawyers and law firms in the franchising industry.

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Highlights of the most recent franchising cases from around the country.

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In a disappointing announcement released on Aug. 6, 2007, Dale Cantone, chairman of the Franchise and Business Opportunity Project Group of the North American Securities Administrators Association, informed the franchise bar that the state authorities that participate in the coordinated review program ('Coordinated Review') have suspended the program until further notice. The announcement also stated the franchise administrators would re-evaluate whether to reintroduce the program after July 1, 2008.

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By now, everyone seriously involved in the practice of franchise law is aware of <i>Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.</i>, 2007 WL 1835892 (S. Ct. June 28, 2007). The Supreme Court in <i>Leegin</i> held that vertical resale price maintenance is no longer unlawful in and of itself. Although hailing the decision as overruling a nearly 100-year prohibition on minimum price fixing, the pundits writing in the wake of <i>Leegin</i> have nevertheless hedged their bets on just how revolutionary the decision is. Their constant mantra is this: <i>Leegin</i> does not open the door to unrestrained resale price maintenance, but rather changes the rules under which courts will evaluate sales agreements setting minimum prices. No longer will courts treat them as unlawful <i>per se</i>; they will now evaluate their legality under something called 'the rule of reason.' If a court (or jury) concludes that an agreement establishing a minimum price is an 'unreasonable restraint of trade,' then the supplier has violated the antitrust laws. If the threat of treble damages from such a finding isn't sobering enough, writers warn us that courts may interpret state 'baby Sherman Acts' as still making resale price maintenance unlawful <i>per se</i>, regardless of what the U.S. Supreme Court says.

Arbitration is under judicial and legislative attack. Late last year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held an unexceptional arbitration agreement to be substantively unconscionable simply because it allowed the franchisor to litigate certain trademark-related claims and gave the franchisor home court advantage. <i>Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc.</i>, 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006). On July 12, 2007, Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduced Senate Bill 1782, known as the 'Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007,' a key provision of which would invalidate pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate franchise disputes.