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A 2006 survey report indicated that 57% of law firms with 100 or more attorneys have mandatory retirement age policies. See L. Jones 'Pitfalls of Mandatory Law Firm Retirement,' <i>National Law Journal</i>, May 24, 2006. But legal challenges to mandatory retirement policies at law firms are likely to become more common as baby boomers reach retirement age.
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While a chemical compound, such as a drug, cannot be patented twice based on the discovery of a new property of the compound (no matter how important), the patent statutes explicitly authorize patents on new uses for 'old compounds.' While such method-of-use claims can be difficult to enforce, they can be extremely valuable, both to society and to the patent owner. AZT, a failed anti-cancer drug, earned millions and extended lives, after Burroughs Wellcome patented its use to treat HIV/AIDs. While a patent on a new use of an old compound can seem unfair, nothing is taken from the public domain. The patent often only confers the right to prevent others from advertising that the drug can be used to treat condition X as well as its 'old use' to treat condition Y. The public remains free to use the 'old drug' for any unpatented purpose.
The European Patent Organisation ('EPO') has previously strictly prohibited protecting methods for medical treatment and diagnosis. However, a recent decision by the Enlarged Board of Appeals has clarified and restricted the grounds for rejection under Article 52(4) EPC on the basis of non-patentable subject matter. Thus, many diagnostic methods that were previously unprotectable in Europe may now be patented so long as they comply with the basic guidelines set forth in the opinion.
Supreme Court, King's County, erred when it vacated an award of child support arrears because the former custodial parent died and the children are now living with their father. <i>Dembitzer v. Rindenow.</i>
Just when we think that the practice of matrimonial law is as complicated as it can get, a case comes down which reminds us of another level of difficulty. <br>In <i>Musso v. Ostashiko</i>, New York Law Journal, Nov. 14, 2006, p. 23, col. 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit definitely resolved one of the many questions that arise from the interaction between matrimonial and bankruptcy law ' an interaction which has been occurring with ever greater frequency over the years.
Child custody jurisdiction in New York hinges primarily on identifying the child's 'home state.' But what if there isn't one?
Justice Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, a Manhattan Supreme Court judge, issued a decision in late December, <i>Gonzalez v. Green</i>, which held that divorce could not be granted to a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts. Despite this, the court found enforceable a separation agreement signed by both parties in anticipation of divorce. The court's reasoning can be taken as cautionary advice to same-sex partners and their attorneys ' particularly the monied partner and his or her legal representative.
In February 2006, after holding many hearings throughout the state, the Matrimonial Commission appointed by Judge Judith Kaye and headed by Judge Sondra Miller issued a final report addressing many issues important to the matrimonial Bar, including issues regarding law guardians for children. The Commission made a good start in the quest to deal with problems surrounding the law guardian system; for example, it recommended that the term 'law guardian' be replaced by 'attorney for the child' (AC), because the term 'law guardian' can cause confusion in the minds of attorneys and litigants alike. However, in spite of the clarification a name change might bring, there remains much confusion as to the role and power of the AC.
