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Last month, we explained that valuation issues come into play throughout Chapter 11 business reorganization cases. We discussed how to recognize the uncertainties underlying expert valuation conclusions; enterprise/going concern value; and the fact that the goal of any valuation is to make an estimate based on an informed judgment that embraces all facts relevant to future earning capacity and hence to present worth, including, of course, the nature and conditions of the properties, the past earnings record, and all circumstances that indicate whether or not the record is reliable criterion of future performance. We conclude this month with a discussion of expert evidence.
The unique environment of the automotive industry has resulted in the insolvencies of tier-one and tier-two suppliers developing distinct characteristics. Unlike many industries, automotive suppliers typically have only a handful of customers, without whom they have no business to reorganize or sell in an effort maximize values for creditors. This gives customers significant control in the options a debtor has when faced with severe financial distress. However, because of Original Equipment Manufacturers' (OEM) just-in-time methods of production ' unlike customers in many businesses that can simply decide not to do business with an insolvent entity ' OEMs and large tier-one suppliers cannot purchase automotive parts or assemblies elsewhere.
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In recent years, debtors in large corporate bankruptcies have sometimes sought and obtained, in varying degrees, authority at the outset of bankruptcy cases for severe restrictions on trading in claims against the debtors by substantial claimholders. In practice, however, these debt-trading orders have chilled the market for trading in debt securities and served to entrench existing management by effectively precluding substantial investors from acquiring meaningful positions in the debtor's debt securities.
In recent years, cases such as <i>Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.</i>, 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ('<i>Enzo</i>') and <i>University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle and Co., Inc.</i>, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ('<i>Rochester</i>') have fueled an ongoing debate over whether the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112 includes a written description requirement, separate and distinct from enablement and best mode. According to Judge Randall Ray Rader, <i>Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.</i>, 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ('<i>Eli Lilly</i>') brought the written description requirement squarely to light. <i>Rochester</i>, 375 F.3d at 1307 (Circuit Judge Rader dissenting). This 'new' requirement creates 'enormous confusion,' not only for the courts, but also for patent drafters. <i>Id.</i> Because the requirement is in flux, patent practitioners should avoid overlooking the requirement or taking it too lightly.
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Recently, in a case of first impression, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board refused to grant trademark protection to the flavor of an antidepressant tablet on the grounds that the flavor was functional and incapable of serving as a mark. <i>In re N.V. Organon</i>, 79 USPQ2d 1639 (TTAB 2006). The decision is a departure from the trend of extending protection to nontraditional trademarks. Although the Board left the door open to the possibility of registering flavor as a trademark, it made clear that future applicants will face significant challenges in registering such marks, including: 1) proving that a flavor has acquired secondary meaning; 2) overcoming the difficulties inherent in protecting a flavor due to the subjective nature of taste; and 3) proving that a flavor functions as a source indicator despite the fact that consumers are not exposed to a product's flavor prior to purchase.
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On Oct. 27, 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in <i>Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.</i> (No. 05-1056), preparing to elucidate the contours of patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(f) as applied to the exportation of software code. This case marks the first time in the 22 years since Congress enacted the provision that the Court will venture into this area. The outcome may have significant ramifications for the software industry because §271(f) was widely assumed to apply only to the tangible components of a physical machine. If §271(f) applies equally to software, then software companies will need to rethink their exposure to liability when exporting software abroad. Liability under §271(f) may extend beyond the initial act of exporting and further include downstream activities, such as copying and installing that are done entirely outside of the United States.
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Highlights of the latest insurance cases from around the country.
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The Third Circuit's <i>Treesdale</i> decision last year understandably drew considerable attention in coverage circles: It was apparently the first reported appellate decision holding that a years-long course of manufacturing asbestos products, resulting in numerous bodily injury claims, constituted a single occurrence. <i>Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc.</i>, 418 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2005). The court's single-occurrence ruling was significant because it meant, in combination with other policy provisions, that the insurer was obligated to pay only a single per-occurrence limit under 10 consecutive policies in respect of its policyholder's entire asbestos liability. <i>Treesdale</i> has potentially broad application in a variety of long-tail liability contexts where per-occurrence limits may be the most important or even sole effective limit of liability. Add the fact that <i>Treesdale</i> was decided as a matter of law, and <i>Treesdale</i> qualifies as a landmark decision in the notoriously results-driven world of number-of-occurrences litigation.
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Most insurance coverage litigation starts with a fundamental dispute over what an insurance policy means. Unfortunately, while California appellate courts have addressed the subject for decades, and while the California Supreme Court attempted to restate the basic principles, there still is considerable debate among litigants and courts as to how insurance policies are to be interpreted. Insurance carriers often contend that California is not as 'pro-insured' as it once was regarded. They often argue that insurance policies should be interpreted simply based on policy language, without reference to any external information, and that if the insured is 'sophisticated,' any ambiguity should be resolved against coverage. However, neither of these arguments is in accord with California law.
