In last month's issue, we discussed how suits seeking damages for the wrongful deaths of cryopreserved pre-embryos are, at present, generally doomed to failure. Unless state legislatures change the definitions of the word "person" in their wrongful death statutes, courts in the several states are going to remain reluctant to extend the availability of wrongful death recovery to what are, arguably, merely potential "persons." The outcome on this issue in our illustrative case, <i>Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona</i>, proved no exception to the rule. However, the Jeters -- who had had their cryopreserved pre-embryos apparently lost by the clinic charged with preserving them -- did prevail in their fight to reinstate their suit on several other grounds. Although based on application of Arizona law, the Jeters' successful arguments on appeal could be used, with some tweaking, in other jurisdictions when reproductive assistance caregivers are accused of failing to act with proper care.

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Recent rulings of interest.

The blind allegiance to what I call the "fool's gold standard" lives on. Anyone with even a passing interest in bioethics knows it is unethical to conduct a double blind placebo controlled trial where standard therapy exists, except under limited circumstances. The exceptions are where: 1) there is no risk of harm if the patient forgoes treatment during the placebo phase such as in a trial for a drug that seeks to cure hair loss or impotence; 2) the standard therapy carries such severe side effects that patients might choose to avoid it; or 3) the standard therapy is otherwise of questionable efficacy. Still, sponsors and researches continue to design and conduct such trials, providing the familiar excuse: "The FDA made us do it."

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Rulings of interest to you and your practice.

When I entered law practice in 1971, it was common in corporate criminal investigations for a single law firm to represent the target corporation and all its relevant employees. They hung together lest they hang separately. Over time, practice changed, and such joint-representation arrangements mostly disappeared. The old paradigm was succeeded by a new one, which recognized the separate interests of the corporation and each of its relevant employees, but also provided a large measure of mutual support and good will on the defense side. This paradigm, too, has been attacked by prosecutors and now has largely disappeared in major federal and some state investigations. It has been succeeded by a new, far harsher paradigm.

Buried deep within the 69-page superseding indictment in the KPMG tax fraud case lies a development with the potential to chill the assertion of the attorney-client privilege by defense attorneys in criminal conspiracy cases. In the conspiracy count in <i>United States v. Stein et al.<i>, the wrongful assertion of the attorney-client privilege has been charged as a central aspect of the crime itself, both as part of the means and methods of the conspiracy and as an overt act in furtherance. This aggressive charging decision may cause some members of the defense bar to think twice about asserting the privilege in close cases -- even where it is being asserted legitimately -- for fear that their claim of privilege may overreach, thus inadvertently implicating them in the underlying conspiracy.

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Recent cases of interest to you and your practice.

E-mail evidence is one of the newest and sharpest arrows in the government's quiver. In recent years the government has won several convictions based on little more than damning e-mail evidence. Nonetheless, people continue to use e-mail casually or even thoughtlessly, producing a data stream of potential admissions. To make matters worse, with the proliferation of portable e-mail devices, such as the ubiquitous Blackberry, the attention paid to each e-mail diminishes while the amount sent rises dramatically.