Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Recent rulings of interest to you and your practice.
Features
<b><i>Part Two of a Two-Part Article</i></b>. Even the IRS appears to have some reservations about its position, particularly as such position is applied to the corporate transferee collecting payments on a shareholder note received as a capital contribution in a Section 351 transaction (or otherwise).
Most professionals in our area of the law hate custody trials. We see how children are pulled apart by the inability of their parents to resolve their disputes; the pressure children face when they are put in the middle of a conflict and the pain of submitting to examinations by different experts, psychologists, lawyers and judges. Those of us who practice responsibly try to inform our clients, to the extent possible, of the risks to their children. We caution them, when we see them spinning off into their anger, or their desire for revenge, to think of their children. We advise them to hire therapists for children who are having trouble. We tell them to encourage their children to attend school-run groups for children whose parents are divorcing.
Features
One who is entitled to receive income, including interest or compensation for services, but assigns the income to another before it becomes due, will be taxed on it just as though he or she had actually received it and then paid it over to the assignee. This concept is known as the assignment of income doctrine.
Features
In September of this year, a medical malpractice suit pending in Wilkes-Barre, PA, generated significant publicity as the case proceeded to trial. In that case, plaintiffs Tukishia and William Bobbett filed suit against Mercy Hospital and several physicians following the death of their 4-year-old son in the hospital's emergency room. The child, Torajee Bobbett, died after spending more than 9 hours at the hospital on July 19, 2001 into July 20, 2001, without obtaining proper treatment, according to documents filed in the court record. Several aspects of plaintiffs' claim related to alleged deficiencies with the Emergency Department's policies, procedures and staffing at the time Torajee was treated.
Features
California law protects defendants from lawsuits designed to thwart "a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue." The "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute provides this protection by permitting the defendant to move to strike the plaintiff's complaint at the outset of litigation unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., ' 425.16, subd. (e)).
Features
A classic medical malpractice trial generally conjures up images of strategic trial lawyers, sympathetic plaintiffs, and zealous expert witnesses all culminating in one statement from the jury regarding both liability and damages. This vision -- one of a unitary trial -- contrasts starkly with a device of civil procedure called a bifurcated trial. One of the primary methods of bifurcating a trial is to separate the liability phase from the damages phase. Though widely utilized in other civil cases, bifurcation is seldom requested -- or granted -- in medical malpractice cases. What is the current state of the law and its application to medical malpractice cases, and what are some practical considerations that may factor into the decision whether to seek bifurcation?
A patient implanted with a medical device is vulnerable to injury if that device is defective, even long after the operation and recovery phases have passed. Some courts have recognized a right to certain types of recovery when there is a prospect of future injury, but others have not. In the recent case of <i>Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C. Inc.</i>, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18013 (6th Cir. 9/23/05), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was asked to answer a related threshold question of first impression in a medical monitoring case: Does an increased risk of harm requiring current medical monitoring serve as a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing to sue?