When I entered law practice in 1971, it was common in corporate criminal investigations for a single law firm to represent the target corporation and all its relevant employees. They hung together lest they hang separately. Over time, practice changed, and such joint-representation arrangements mostly disappeared. The old paradigm was succeeded by a new one, which recognized the separate interests of the corporation and each of its relevant employees, but also provided a large measure of mutual support and good will on the defense side. This paradigm, too, has been attacked by prosecutors and now has largely disappeared in major federal and some state investigations. It has been succeeded by a new, far harsher paradigm.

Buried deep within the 69-page superseding indictment in the KPMG tax fraud case lies a development with the potential to chill the assertion of the attorney-client privilege by defense attorneys in criminal conspiracy cases. In the conspiracy count in <i>United States v. Stein et al.<i>, the wrongful assertion of the attorney-client privilege has been charged as a central aspect of the crime itself, both as part of the means and methods of the conspiracy and as an overt act in furtherance. This aggressive charging decision may cause some members of the defense bar to think twice about asserting the privilege in close cases -- even where it is being asserted legitimately -- for fear that their claim of privilege may overreach, thus inadvertently implicating them in the underlying conspiracy.

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Recent cases of interest to you and your practice.

E-mail evidence is one of the newest and sharpest arrows in the government's quiver. In recent years the government has won several convictions based on little more than damning e-mail evidence. Nonetheless, people continue to use e-mail casually or even thoughtlessly, producing a data stream of potential admissions. To make matters worse, with the proliferation of portable e-mail devices, such as the ubiquitous Blackberry, the attention paid to each e-mail diminishes while the amount sent rises dramatically.

Recent rulings of importance to you and your practice.

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The sale of a debtor's assets through a bankruptcy court supervised auction process has become more commonplace and, some theorize, under the amended law, may increase in popularity. Often, the process includes the use of a "stalking horse" agreement establishing a baseline of price and other terms for the sale of the assets. In return, the stalking horse bidder obtains certain bid protections (<i>ie</i>, break-up fees and/or expense reimbursements). At the close of the auction, either the stalking horse bidder either places the highest initial (or competing) bid or is outbid, maintaining a claim for the bid protections.

Last month, we reported on two recent Delaware cases that came to opposite conclusions as to whether a bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims asserted by a post-confirmation litigation trust: <i>IT Litigation Trust v. D'Aniello, et al.</i> (<i>In re: IT Group, Inc., et al.</i> held that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over such claims, while <i>Shandler v. DLJ Merchant Banking, Inc., et al.</i> (<i>In re Insilco Technologies, Inc.</i>)(<i>Insilco</i>) held that it did not. After the article went to press, the Delaware courts weighed in on the subject for the third time in only 3 months. This article provides the update.

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As anyone who has advised a private equity fund in connection with the potential insolvency of one of its portfolio companies knows, reconciling the duty of the fund's designated directors sitting on the portfolio company's board with the fund's duties to its investors can feel like a high wire act at times. As fiduciaries for its investors, the fund's managers must act in a manner consistent with maximizing the return on invested funds. Yet, these same managers are often directors of the fund's portfolio companies. While a portfolio company is thriving, the duties to the fund's investors and the fund manager's duties as a director of the portfolio company are typically in harmony. However, when the portfolio company's business turns sour, and it approaches insolvency or is insolvent, the shifting of the directors' fiduciary duties to the company's creditors can cause irreconcilable conflicts of interest along with consternation on how to fund ongoing operations. This article discusses possible structural mechanisms to address and potentially avoid these irreconcilable conflicts while still maintaining the ability to manage the fund's investment and fund the portfolio company's ongoing business.