Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
On June 24th, the Supreme Court decided a case that has sent a virtual shock-wave through the criminal justice system and threatens to upset the long-established practice of sentencing defendants under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), the Court invalidated a defendant's sentence imposed under the State of Washington's sentencing guidelines by holding that the Sixth Amendment prohibits a judge from increasing a defendant's sentence based on facts beyond those found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
Despite Justice Scalia's terse statement in a footnote that the Court expressed no opinion on the federal guidelines because they were not before the Court, the Blakely ruling has rendered the federal guidelines vulnerable to attack. Using the current guidelines, judges are required to consider certain facts — found by a “preponderance of the evidence” — which provide the basis for sentence enhancements. These facts are rarely charged in the indictment and never submitted to a jury. This has been the practice in federal courts for 17 years and is also used in many states. Many commentators say the practice is inconsistent with the Court's ruling in Blakely.
Several federal courts have agreed, declaring the federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. Yet where the Guidelines have been declared unconstitutional, there is profound disagreement over how sentences should now be formulated. Individual district judges have endorsed each of the following remedies: postponing sentencing until further clarification is available; sentencing defendants somewhere between the statutory minimum and maximum without using the guidelines; applying only the constitutional portions of the guidelines; issuing alternative sentences that attempt to predict the future of the sentencing laws and remove the necessity of re-sentencing. In US v. Ameline, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the guidelines were inconsistent with Blakely and as a potential remedy, the court said that a district judge had authority to convene a sentencing jury, much like in capital cases. It won't be long before a jury, somewhere, will hear sentence enhancements.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.