Talk about a balance of power. Debtors want to sell assets for maximum value. Bidders want to buy cheaply and with finality. While debtors want flexible auctions, if the rules are open-ended, bidders will stay home.
Can the Sequel Make More Money Than the Original?
Talk about a balance of power. Debtors want to sell assets for maximum value. Bidders want to buy cheaply and with finality. While debtors want flexible auctions, if the rules are open-ended, bidders will stay home. So what happens to bidder confidence when, after the auction concludes, but before the sale is approved, a late bidder offers more money? Bankruptcy courts must weigh the potential benefits to the estate against the reasonable expectations of the auction participants and the impact of accepting a late bid on the integrity of bankruptcy auctions. Recently, the Seventh Circuit examined this tension in <i>Corporate Assets, Inc. v. Paloian</i>, 368 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2004) (<i>Paloian</i>) [as analysed in last month's issue].
This premium content is locked for The Bankruptcy Strategist subscribers only
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN The Bankruptcy Strategist
- Stay current on the latest information, rulings, regulations, and trends
- Includes practical, must-have information on copyrights, royalties, AI, and more
- Tap into expert guidance from top entertainment lawyers and experts
Already have an account? Sign In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate access, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or call 1-877-256-2473.






