Talk about a balance of power. Debtors want to sell assets for maximum value. Bidders want to buy cheaply and with finality. While debtors want flexible auctions, if the rules are open-ended, bidders will stay home.
Can the Sequel Make More Money Than the Original?
Talk about a balance of power. Debtors want to sell assets for maximum value. Bidders want to buy cheaply and with finality. While debtors want flexible auctions, if the rules are open-ended, bidders will stay home. So what happens to bidder confidence when, after the auction concludes, but before the sale is approved, a late bidder offers more money? Bankruptcy courts must weigh the potential benefits to the estate against the reasonable expectations of the auction participants and the impact of accepting a late bid on the integrity of bankruptcy auctions. Recently, the Seventh Circuit examined this tension in <i>Corporate Assets, Inc. v. Paloian</i>, 368 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2004) (<i>Paloian</i>) [as analysed in last month's issue].
By
Adam C. Rogoff And Nathan HaynesThis premium content is locked for The Bankruptcy Strategist subscribers only
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN The Bankruptcy Strategist
- Stay current on the latest information, rulings, regulations, and trends
- Includes practical, must-have information on copyrights, royalties, AI, and more
- Tap into expert guidance from top entertainment lawyers and experts
Already have an account? Sign In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate access, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or call 1-877-256-2473.
