An Analysis of Knorr-Bremse

It has long been held that a good faith reliance on timely and competent advice of counsel can negate a charge of willful patent infringement. Such advice of counsel can be used to potentially shield an infringer from having to pay enhanced damages of up to three times the damages under 35 U.S.C. &sect;284 and/or the patentee's attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. &sect;285. Similarly, a defendant's failure to obtain advice of counsel until after the company commenced its infringing activities would be evidence of willful infringement. <i>Underwater Devices Incorporated v. Morrison-Knudsen Company,</i> 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The practical application of this rule has been fraught with difficulty, however, since assertion of an opinion of counsel as a defense to a charge of willfulness typically involves a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to communications surrounding the opinion. The tension created by this dynamic was exacerbated by an adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was unfavorable if an accused infringer refused to waive privilege and disclose an opinion of counsel in defense of a willfulness charge. <i>Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc.,</i> 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in <i>Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp.,</i> 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 19185 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (<i>en banc</i>) abolished the adverse inference rule, but also reaffirmed that one is under a duty of care to avoid infringement.

26 minute read November 09, 2004 at 04:50 PM

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Stephen C. Durant and Gene H. Yee