Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
An important representation issue under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) involves scenarios where the scope of a bargaining unit is proposed to include both an employer's regular workers and employees supplied by a separate employer, such as a staffing agency. Just over 4 years ago in M. B. Sturgis, 331 NLRB 1298 (2000), the Board stated that “a growing number of employees who are part of what is commonly described as the 'contingent work force' are being effectively denied representational rights guaranteed them under the National Labor Relations Act.” Therefore, the Board majority in Sturgis – -consisting of Chairman Truesdale and Members Fox and Liebman — overruled prior precedent in Lee Hospital, 300 NLRB 947 (1990) and Greenhoot, Inc., 205 NLRB 250 (1973), and held that a bargaining unit could include both regular and supplied employees without the consent of both the regular employer and the supplier employer.
The Consent Principle
The Board revived the consent principle recently in Oakwood Care Center, 343 NLRB No. 76 (2004), holding that units consisting of both regular and supplied employees constitute multiemployer units, which may be appropriate only with the consent of the parties. This time, a Board majority consisting of Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg found that while the Supreme Court has authorized the practice of multiemployer bargaining units where the parties consent to such a unit, the NLRA “reflects that Congress has not authorized the Board to direct elections in units encompassing the employees of more than one employer” without such consent. The Board's decision in Oakwood Care Center serves to resurrect the employer's voice in the determination of an appropriate unit where a “contingent workforce” is involved — and possibly at the expense of supplied employees who seek union representation.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.