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Asbestos-Related Injury Is Not a 'Bodily Injury By Accident'

By Paul Kalish
January 03, 2006

In its recent decision in Riverwood International Corp. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, No. 04-30608, 2005 WL 1840057 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2005), the Fifth Circuit affirmed an award of summary judgment in favor of an insurer, holding that asbestos-related injury is not a “bodily injury by accident.”

Riverwood involved a coverage dispute between Graphic Packaging International, Inc., formerly known as Riverwood International Corp. (“Riverwood”), and its insurer, Employers Insurance of Wausau (“Wausau”), which provided workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance to Riverwood from May 1974 to January 1984. The policies provided coverage for claims involving both “bodily injury by accident” and “bodily injury by disease,” and stated that “[t]he contraction of disease is not an accident within the meaning of the word 'accident' in the term 'bodily injury by accident' and only such disease as results directly from a bodily injury by accident is included within the term 'bodily injury by accident.'” Riverwood, 2005 WL 1840057, at *3. The policies further provided that “the term 'bodily injury by disease' includes only such disease as is not included within the term 'bodily injury by accident.'” Id.

In early 2000, numerous employees brought suit against Riverwood seeking damages for asbestos-related diseases allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos while working at Riverwood's paperboard manufacturing facility in Monroe, LA. Wausau denied Riverwood's claim for coverage for the underlying asbestos claims, based in part on an exclusion in the policies that barred coverage for “bodily injury by disease” claims unless they were brought within 36 months after the end of the policy period. Riverwood appealed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to Wausau based on its finding that the 36-month exclusion barred coverage. The issue facing the Fifth Circuit, therefore, was whether the underlying asbestos claims were “bodily injury by disease” claims subject to the 36-month exclusion, or whether the claims were “bodily injury by accident” claims not subject to the exclusion.

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