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Equitable Distribution
In a long-term marriage with a large marital estate, the court rightly considered the wife's distributive award, her involvement in the husband's business and role of mother and companion, in determining the amount of maintenance and child support. Ciampa v. Ciampa, Index No. 3276/2002, 2006-04685, Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department, January 22, 2008.
In this marriage in which the couple had four children, the wife was awarded 35% of the husband's business interests, $7000 per month as durational maintenance for a period of five years, and child support of $1,490.38 per week. The husband was awarded a credit in the marital residence of the sum of $75,000, and was ordered to pay the wife's counsel and expert fees, and directed to maintain life insurance for the duration of his child support and maintenance obligations. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that an award of 35% of the husband's business to the wife was appropriate where the wife only had a limited involvement in the business and considered the wife's direct and indirect contributions as the primary caretaker of the parties' children, as a homemaker and social companion while foregoing her career as an attorney. The court further held an award of $7,000 per month as durational maintenance was appropriate in considering the parties' standard of living during the marriage, their property and income, and the $4.5 million distribution award that the wife would be receiving as part of the matrimonial action. It was further appropriate to calculate the child support at the rate of $1,490.38 per week by capping the total parental income at $250,000, when considering the maintenance and distribution award that the wife would be receiving, and that the children had a comfortable, but comparably modest lifestyle. It was further appropriate to award counsel fees and expert fees to the wife up to the amount the husband paid for his legal fees. The appellate court modified the decision of the lower court only to provide the husband with a credit for the $94,000 already paid by him toward the wife's legal fees and a credit for the advance of $100,000 from the equitable distribution award he previously provided to the wife.
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