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Texas Court of Appeals Won't Let Former Lawyer for Matthew Knowles Use State's Anti-SLAPP Statute to Dismiss Knowles' Cross-Claims in Legal Fees Dispute

In a case alleging non-payment of legal fees, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the partial denial of a lawyer's motion to dismiss counter- and cross-claims filed by former client Matthew Knowles and his company, Music World Properties. Lang v. Knowles, 01-18-00268-CV. The Lang Ferrer law firm sued Knowles and Music World for alleged non-payment of $49,120 in legal fees. The causes of action include, among others, breach of contract, fraud and unjust enrichment. Knowles responded with a series of allegations against the firm, including unfair debt collection practices, legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Knowles charged that Lang Ferrer falsely claimed he had auctioned off memorabilia of his former management clients Destiny's Child and his daughter Beyoncé, to avoid paying creditors. Attorney Shannon Lang filed a motion under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §27.003 et seq., the state's anti-SLAPP statute, to dismiss the cross-claims against her. Lang argued her legal fees claims were "based on or related to her 'exercise of the right to petition'" under the First Amendment. The defendants in turn filed a long list of accusations, such as claiming the lawyers "charg[ed] excessive fees for the[] sparse legal work," that "nothing meaningful was done" on behalf of Knowles and his company "after the legal invoices of the [Law F]irm were disputed." The Harris County Texas Court denied Lang's motion to dismiss, except for Music World's claim of unfair debt collection practices. Lang filed an interlocutory appeal. In affirming the lower court, the state appeals court noted: "Lang argues that Knowles and Music World's legal action, i.e., cross-claims, is based on the petition and [fees] Demand Letter, and the republication of those documents by media outlets. However, the Demand Letter was sent by an attorney representing 'Lang Ferrer, PLLC,' i.e., the Law Firm. Similarly, the original petition in this case was filed by the Law Firm as the only plaintiff. There is no indication in either the Demand Letter or the original petition that either were sent on behalf of Lang, individually, as opposed to the Law Firm. … In other words, Lang, in her individual capacity, has not exercised her right to petition. Nor, has she, as alleged, exercised her right to free speech based on republication of the petition and Demand Letter in blogs and media outlets." The appeals court continued: "And the claims brought against Lang and Ferrer for 'misconduct' and 'negligence' are in connection with the Law Firm's previous representation of Knowles and Music World, not the Law Firm's Demand Letter or original petition in this instant case. As such, Lang has not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the TCPA applies to the claims at issue."