LJN Newsletters

Two courts in the Ninth Circuit have recently addressed how to differentiate between an 'owner' and a mere 'licensee' for purposes of rights under the Copyright Act, and have reached decisions that might surprise many practitioners.

The recording industry estimates that music piracy has cost it billions of dollars during the past 15 years. Facing the potential for an industry-wide collapse, the RIAA undertook its aggressive litigation campaign to protect itself and its constituents from copyright infringement by suing individual file sharers. After fighting a public relations battle over some of its tactics, the RIAA has chosen to temper its aggressiveness. The RIAA is instead forming relationships with ISPs that maintain the online accounts of the consumers.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT/RULE 12(b)(6) DISMISSAL
THEATRICAL OPTIONS/FUTURE ENFORCEABILITY

In January 2008, the California Supreme Court decided that the doctrine of severability of contracts could be applied to the state's Talent Agencies Act (TAA). Under the supreme court's ruling, a personal manager's activities as an unlicensed talent agent may be severed from the manager's legal activities, the latter still being commissionable from the artist by the manager.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to grant a judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial for the former business manager of musician Yngwie Malmsteen in a suit by the musician over missing income.

The Federal Circuit issued its decision in Sundance v. DeMonte, overruling the district court's holding of non-obviousness. Applying the standard set forth in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the court found that the patent was an obvious combination of the prior art and noted that the district court committed two errors by: 1) erroneously allowing a patent attorney, who was not skilled in the relevant technology, to testify regarding obviousness; and 2) vacating the jury verdict of obviousness and granting judgment as a matter of law on non-obviousness, based on its erroneous interpretation of the prior art.

Was Marilyn Monroe domiciled in New York and not California when she died in 1962? If it was California, the company succeeding to her rights might have publicity rights after her death, if that state's statute extending publicity rights back from when the statute originally took effect was constitutional. The new California statute is retroactive as well as prospective. Monroe, of course, never heard of publicity rights, which were enacted in California in 1984. If it was New York, there are no publicity rights, only privacy rights, which ended with her death.

In the intersection between trademark rights and the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court's grant of summary judgment finding that the First Amendment protected the look of a video game's virtual strip joint, as well as the use of the Pig Pen name.