Employees and job applicants are increasingly filing claims of discrimination based on their appearance or image. The future scope of such claims may hinge on the outcome of a case currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

With little or no incremental cost, companies can now store unfathomable amounts of data and information about their business. Documents, e-mails, and financial data all can be sent and retained indefinitely with the simple click of a mouse. As remarkable and efficient as these capabilities are, they create dramatic new challenges for individuals and organizations alike. Employers, in particular, are faced with new challenges involving the retention of electronic records and data. What should be saved? How long is long enough? And what obligations do employers have to preserve electronic records when faced with actual or threatened litigation?

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The message from our plaintiffs' lawyer colleagues has been steady and direct: "Don't bother defending these cases — you're going to lose and you're going to lose big. Just pay us all lots of money now and save yourself a lot of pain and agony." And what other message would they send? Their goal is to reap the highest reward from the least amount of effort. Litigating every case on every level; financing and staffing hundreds of complex trials, and waiting for final appellate review of every verdict is no way to run a mass tort practice — at least not from the plaintiffs' perspective. Given this author's perspective, it makes sense to examine the options more carefully before deciding that the only way to avoid ruin is to wire massive sums into the trial bar's trust accounts.

Statistical analysis of federal litigation provides a unique insight into particular judges involved in a case, including information on the probable timing/outcomes of cases, and what significant motions are generally granted or denied before a federal judge. Answers are based on verifiable facts, rather than anecdotal assumptions, and provide interested parties with more accurate data.

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Dr. David Graham, a courageous FDA expert, blew the whistle and started a cascade of events that ultimately led to Merck & Co., Inc.'s withdrawal of its blockbuster drug Vioxx. Recently, he testified in Congress that Vioxx could be "the single greatest drug catastrophe of this country." Various experts have postulated that Vioxx may be directly responsible for 20,000 to 160,000 heart attacks or strokes with perhaps as many as 40,000 deaths.

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Amid a cacophony of wailing and gnashing of teeth decrying the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA's") failure to protect the public from unsafe drugs, the FDA held an emergency advisory committee meeting, which included consultants, to address the safety issues associated with the use of COX-2 selective and non-selective non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs ("NAIDs"). The meeting was scheduled and held at warp speed. It provided a transparent dispassionate opportunity to address the safety issues for scientists, affected parties and the public. The decisions of the advisory committee were to some extent, unexpected. This accelerated review process differs from the current advisory committee process of reviewing limited data in a product pre-approval setting. However, this use is a natural extension of the FDA's historic use of advisory committees, <i>ie</i>, analysis of voluminous data on any active ingredient over a period of years and application of the analysis to specific drug products containing the active ingredient.

It seems that the same question is asked every time two pharmaceutical plaintiffs' lawyers get together these days: "Don't you think Merck can just pull a Baycol?" Referring to Bayer's strategy for resolving the recent litigation over Bayer's dangerous &mdash; and withdrawn &mdash; statin drug, these lawyers are concerned that Merck, like Bayer, can somehow escape compensating thousands of victims. No doubt due to the widely read article in The Wall Street Journal (May 3, 2004) that essentially gave Bayer an "academy award" for its handling of Baycol, reporters across the country, trying to analyze the emerging Merck debacle last fall, were asking the same question of their trial lawyer interviewees. What these inquiring minds are inquiring about is whether Merck, clearly faced with thousands of actions, can "lump and split" them. On the one side, Merck would place a very large pile of cases it deems non-compensable, and on the other, a much smaller pile comprised of those cases that Merck will agree to discuss and value. The answer to this question seems to be, at this relatively early date, that even if Merck wishes it could approach the problem this way, it cannot. Moreover, it cannot use the strategy it used in the phenylpropanolamine ("PPA"), Propulsid, or Rezulin litigation, either. In fact, any attempt to apply the strategies employed in those litigations may end in sheer disaster.

On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 into law (the "Act"). Although the Act has received much media attention in recent months for its potential impact upon consumers seeking protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"), it does contain a number of amendments to the Code that will affect, either directly or indirectly, the ways in which equipment lessors will relate to their liquidating or reorganizing lessees. This article provides a brief overview of some of the new amendments to the Code and explains how they will change the dynamics between lessors and lessees.