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Several U.S. appellate courts have expressed discomfort with the breadth of 18 U.S.C. ' 666 ("Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds") because its literal language makes certain theft and bribery federal crimes even when there is arguably no federal interest. Some circuits construed the statute to require a federal nexus to the wrongdoing, but each circuit that did so adopted a different test. Others refused to limit the statute at all. The Supreme Court last term purported to resolve the circuit split by affirming Congress's power to prohibit the corruption of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds, regardless whether the crime has a federal nexus. United States v. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004). Sabri rejected the constitutional limits courts had added to the statute, but it did not address the view of some courts that certain words within ' 666 express Congress's intent to limit the statute's reach on grounds of federalism.

Encouraged by recent amendments to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, federal prosecutors are pressuring target companies to turn on their employees in ways that were unthinkable a few years ago ... Target companies have become active extensions of the government for purposes of coercing their employees into jeopardizing any opportunity they have to mount a successful defense against possible criminal charges.

In the legislative process that led to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), legislators from both sides of the aisle vied with each other to establish their credentials for being tough on white-collar crime. The maximum penalties for mail fraud and wire fraud were increased from 5 to 20 years. Pub. L. No. 107-204 ' 903. The maximum penalty for willful violations of any provision of the Exchange Act or rule or regulation adopted thereunder the violation of which is unlawful was increased from 10 to 20 years. Pub. L. No. 107-204 ' 903. If this were not enough, a new crime relating to securities fraud in connection with the securities of public companies with a maximum penalty of 25 years was created. Pub. L. No. 107-204 ' 807 This does not exhaust the list, but should be sufficient to suggest that there are more than enough post-SOX criminal laws covering financial fraud to deter rational corporate officers and others to refrain from participating in financial crimes.

Recent rulings of importance to you and your practice.

It is the uncommon occasion when creditors seek the Bankruptcy Court's assistance to impose a settlement that compromises the debtor's asserted rights to recovery against third parties. While settlements are typically preferable to the debtor's engagement in contested and costly litigation, it is a challenge to convince a court to compromise a debtor's asserted claims. In a recent case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, a settlement was negotiated and ultimately approved by the Bankruptcy Court over the vigorous objection of the debtors-in-possession (the "Debtors"), resolving a hotly contested adversary proceeding and third party claims.

The April and May issues of The Bankruptcy Strategist featured a scholarly, interesting, and informative article by Michael L. Cook and William R. Fabrizio on the recent Seventh Circuit Kmart Opinion (In Re Kmart Corporation, 359 F. 3d 866 (7 Cir. 2004)) in which the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's reversal (Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corporation, 291 B. R. 818 (ND Ill. 2003)) of four "critical vendor" orders entered by the Bankruptcy Judge. In all respects but one, Cook and Fabrizio concisely and accurately analyzed the Opinion as well as the history and basic flaws of the so-called "Necessity" Doctrine. Moreover, we agree not only with their conclusion that "the [Necessity] Doctrine ... lacks explicit Code authorization," but also with their flat rejection of such erroneous (and insulting) comments as that of the unnamed practitioner who was quoted by Reuters as stating that the District Court Opinion was "[A] tremendous blow to the efforts of the Chicago bench and bar to fashion their bankruptcy court system in the mold of Delaware and New York." The Bankruptcy Strategist, April 2004, p. 2. Unfortunately when they come to the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Cook and Fabrizio overstate the case.

Across the nation, readers of this publication are plagued daily with myriad problems associated with "megabankruptcies" and complex reorganization cases, and sometimes with Chapter 11s that are just large enough to be cumbersome and unwieldy, but too important and/or lucrative to pass up. Notwithstanding what is generally the statutory clarity of the Bankruptcy Code, many of the solutions to these nettlesome issues have evolved on an ad hoc basis, and are often the creatures of local customs and practice, if not the rules and procedures of individual judges. Putting aside the natural peaks and valleys of Chapter 11 filings, these issues persist, no matter the economic climate.

On a procedural vote on July 8, the U.S. Senate declined to move forward a bill that would have limited the use of class-action lawsuits. Although the Class Action Fairness Act reportedly had the support of at least the 60 Senators needed to take up the bill, efforts by some to attach unrelated provisions to it led to its doom.