CAFA: Finding a Method to the Madness of 'Mass Actions'
April 26, 2007
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ('CAFA') expanded federal jurisdiction over putative class actions. Under CAFA, the federal diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. '1332, was amended to allow for both original and removal jurisdiction over putative class actions where: 1) the putative class action consists of at least 100 proposed class members; 2) the citizenship of at least one proposed class member is different from that of any defendant ('minimal diversity'); and 3) the matter in controversy, after aggregating the claims of the proposed class members, exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs. <i>See generally</i> P.L. 109-2 '4(a), codified at 28 U.S.C. '1332(d). This expanded federal diversity jurisdiction is subject to certain exceptions, including the 'local controversy' and 'home-state controversy' exceptions, where, <i>inter alia</i>, a certain percentage of putative class members and the 'primary defendants,' or defendants from whom 'significant relief is sought,' are citizens of the forum state. <i>See</i> 28 U.S.C. '1332(d)(3) and (4).
The RED ZONE - Selecting Outside Counsel
April 10, 2007
Buyers of legal services often hold attitudes unsuspected by law firms. These are often based upon needs which are unexployed by law firms. This article looks at the pressures GC's are under.
Asbestos Injuries and the 'Completed Operations' Provision
March 29, 2007
In asbestos insurance coverage litigation, the extent of an insurer's liability to its insured often turns on whether the court determines that the underlying asbestos injury took place while the insured was conducting operations, such as asbestos installation or tear out, or after such operations were completed. This distinction is important to the insurer because under many general liability policies injuries taking place during operations may be held as not subject to aggregate limits, whereas injuries taking place after completion typically are held subject to aggregate limits.
Case Notes
March 29, 2007
Highlights of the latest product liability cases from around the country.
Lawyers' Detective Work Pays Off
March 29, 2007
When they got the case, Miami attorneys Thomas and Elizabeth Culmo had virtually no information about the allegedly defective motor scooter that had caused their client a serious spinal injury.
Tendering Claims to Manufacturers, Suppliers
March 29, 2007
The birth of modern-day product liability law was arguably delivered in 1963 by the California Supreme Court in <i>Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,</i> 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963). Today, product liability law is commonly understood to mean that all participants in the chain of distribution of a defective product are strictly liable for injuries caused by that product. Strict liability generally means that any seller in the distribution chain is liable if the product is defective, even if the seller was not responsible for making that product defective. There are a variety of different sellers in today's global economy that partially or completely assemble or manufacture their products and can be held responsible for defects even if not sued in the original action. Sellers in the distribution chain are vast and include manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers. Those lower in the distribution chain (<i>i.e.,</i> those closer to the ultimate purchaser of the product) often seek defense and indemnity from upstream participants.
Practice Tip: Sixth Circuit Rules on Privilege in Two Cases
March 29, 2007
The Sixth Circuit has recently handed down two opinions on attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege. These opinions are of special interest to product liability practitioners, experts who testify in product liability matters, and anyone else involved in matters where discovery of documents might be crucial.
Exploring the Status of the Obvious Danger Doctrine in Failure-to-Warn Cases
March 28, 2007
Traditional tort law principles provide that product manufacturers and sellers have a duty to warn of hidden risks that pose a danger to product users. As a corollary, courts generally hold that manufacturers and sellers have no duty to warn consumers of obvious dangers inherent in the product. Consequently, most judges have left to the jury the question of whether the danger of injury from a product is obvious. Against this backdrop, a recent decision has cast doubt on the accepted notion that obviousness is necessarily a question for the jury. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Michigan held in <i>Greene v. A.P. Products, Ltd.</i>, 717 N.W.2d 855, <i>reh'g denied</i>, 720 N.W.2d 748 (Mich. 2006) that, as a matter of law, hair oil posed an open and obvious danger to consumers that negated any duty to warn that the product could kill if ingested or inhaled.
