Index
A guide to everything in this issue.
Court Sustains Recreation Impact Fee
In <i>Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe</i> (NYLJ 11/21/03, p.19, col. 5), the New York Court of Appeals addressed an issue that has been unresolved in New York since the United States Supreme Court's 1994 opinion in <i>Dolan v. City of Tigard</i>, 512 US 374: Can a municipality collect a payment in lieu of parkland dedication as the price for approving a subdivision when the municipality has not made an individualized determination of the need for recreational facilities generated by the proposed subdivision? The court had little difficulty upholding the fee, raising two further questions: first, will the court's decision survive scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court, and second, what constitutional limits remain on a municipality's power to impose fees on developers?
Development
Recent rulings of importance to you and your clients.
Selling 'Free and Clear': Will It Continue?
Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an extraordinary tool to trustees and debtors in possession -- the ability to sell property "free and clear." This unique power, unavailable to a seller outside bankruptcy, not only facilitates the tasks of liquidation or reorganization, but it may even be the critical incentive for entering bankruptcy in the first place. It has now become the principal focus of many Chapter 11 cases.
When to Use a 'Stalking Horse' Agreement
A debtor has a fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the assets of its estate. When selling assets of a bankruptcy estate, the process usually begins with an extensive marketing process. As a result of extensive marketing, a debtor can find itself actively negotiating with numerous potential purchasers. While most marketing periods end with a court-approved auction, it has become commonplace for the debtor to enter into the auction process with a "stalking horse" agreement in place.
Clearing the Confusion
As explained in last month's article, there has been a great deal of confusion in the courts regarding Section 365(b)(2)(D). In a detailed opinion on appeal, the Ninth Circuit diverged from two lower courts, holding that the most natural reading of subsection (b)(2)(d) requires a finding that the word "penalty" modifies both "rate" and "provision." This ruling, as discussed in last month's article, caused further confusion in the courts as to interpretation.
