Inducement Theory In <i>Grokster </i>Leaves Unanswered Questions
August 18, 2005
In <i>MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster</i>, the Supreme Court decided that the defendants could be held liable for copyright infringement perpetrated by the users of their respective software. Rather than clarifying the "significant non-infringing use" standard from <i>Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.</i>, to determine whether the defendants could be held liable for distributing a product with knowledge that it could be used to infringe, the Court utilized an alternative approach of finding liability. Turning to common law precedent and patent law, the unanimous Court held that liability may be based on purposeful, culpable expression under an inducement theory of secondary infringement. While some of the potential implications of this decision can be predicted, the full effect will not likely be clear for some time.
'Unanimous' Vote In <i>Grokster</i> Has Split Views
August 18, 2005
The future direction of digital technologies was on the line when the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in March over peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing software. And few were predicting that the Justices would easily reach their decision. Given the difficult copyright law and policy issues in the case, it seemed highly unlikely that the Justices could all agree. But 3 months after oral arguments, the Court surprised many observers by issuing a unanimous decision ' at least as to the main holding.
A Bow to Innovation: The Supreme Court's Decision in MGM v. Grokster
August 01, 2005
The Supreme Court's recent decision in <i>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.</i>, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2005) is noteworthy for the Court's decision to sidestep modifying the standard that the Court set in the <i>Sony</i> case in 1984 as to when a product distributor can be liable for infringing uses of its product. Although the Supreme Court was faced with compelling arguments from copyright owners and the technology industry alike both for and against modifying the standard in <i>Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios</i>, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), it ultimately found that Grokster and its co-defendant StreamCast could be liable for infringing downloads, not because they distributed a product that was used to infringe copyrights, but because they took the additional step of actively inducing their users to download copyrighted material. In so doing, the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether it was appropriate that a mere distributor of a product "capable of substantial noninfringing use" should avoid liability even when its product is being used for massive copyright infringement.
MGM v. Grokster: Inducement Theory Leaves Unanswered Questions
July 29, 2005
In <i>MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.</i>, No. 04-480 (June 27, 2005), the Supreme Court decided that the defendants could be held liable for copyright infringement perpetrated by the users of their respective software. Rather than clarifying the "significant noninfringing use" standard from <i>Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.</i>, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), to determine whether the defendants could be held liable for distributing a product with knowledge that it could be used to infringe, the Court utilized an alternative approach of finding liability. Turning to common law precedent and patent law, the unanimous Court held that liability may be based on purposeful, culpable expression under an inducement theory of secondary infringement. While some of the potential implications of this decision can be predicted, the full effect will not likely be clear for some time.
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD Uncertainty in the Scope of the Section 271(e)(1) Exemption
July 29, 2005
On June 13, 2005, the Supreme Court in <i>Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.</i>, 545 U.S. ___, 2005 WL 1383624 (2005) ruled that the safe-harbor infringement exemption of 35 U.S.C. '271(e)(1) may apply to non-clinical research on a patented compound as long as there is a reasonable basis to believe that the compound tested could itself be the subject of an FDA submission or that experiments with the compound will produce the kinds of information relevant to an Investigational New Drug Application ("IND") or a New Drug Application ("NDA"); the exemption may apply even though the patented compound never itself becomes the subject of an FDA submission or the experimental results arising from its use never reported in a submission. The decision reversed the holding of the Federal Circuit (331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) that the exemption applies only to research used to obtain information that is submitted to the FDA as part of an application for regulatory approval. The Court expressly refused, however, to consider whether '271(e)(1) might exempt "research tools" from infringement liability. Although the Court interpreted the reach of the '271(e)(1) exemption broadly, the issue of whether use of patented research tools falls within it remains unresolved.
Using Daubert to Defeat Causation in the Delayed Diagnosis Claim
July 29, 2005
<b><i>Part Two of a Two-Part Article</i></b>: The <i>McDowell</i> case discussed in the first part of this article presented the question of "whether it is so if an expert says it is so." <i>See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co.</i>, 826 F.2d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). <i>Daubert</i> and its progeny answered in the negative and established that an expert may not present a bare causation conclusion to the jury when that expert has no scientific basis for that conclusion or for any of the predicate inferences leading up to it. The <i>McDowell</i> claim failed because a physician's personal clinical experience, sometimes called anecdotal experience, is simply not a proper scientific basis for causation opinion testimony.
<b>Commentary:</b> 'Unanimous' Vote In Grokster Has Split Views
July 28, 2005
In its opinion, the Supreme Court clearly focused the test for copyright infringement liability on the subjective question of the purpose of the software's distribution ' an approach that better comports with basic notions of fairness than that of the courts below. But read together, the plurality opinion and two concurring opinions raise a new set of disquieting questions.
Remedying <i>Grokster</i>
July 28, 2005
Don't you hate it when you ask someone a question and, rather than answering it, they choose to answer a different one? Then you understand the frustration…
