United States Supreme Court

The limits on wire fraud prosecutions are continuing to evolve, with courts pushing back on further narrowing the scope of the wire fraud statute post-Ciminelli and Percoco.

A computer scientist is asking the U.S. Supreme Court to extend copyright protection to works created entirely by artificial intelligence in one of the first cases to reach the justices about the revolutionary technology.

On May 22, 2025, the Supreme Court endorsed the “fraudulent inducement” theory of wire fraud in Kousisis v. United States, departing from its recent trend of narrowing the scope of broadly worded criminal statutes, including the wire fraud statute. This decision appears to allow the government to obtain a conviction even where the defendant did not intend to cause economic harm to their counterparty, so long as the defendant made material false statements in order to obtain property from another.

This article describes the prosecution in Thompson, then turns to the Supreme Court’s rejection of the government’s contention that 18 U.S.C. §1014 criminalizes misleading as well as false statements.

A follow up to the article on a briefing in 'Kousisis v. United States' before the U.S. Supreme Court that considers the viability of the fraudulent inducement theory. Arguments before the Court took place on Dec. 9, and the authors provide an update.

In February 2024, the Fourth Circuit addressed a jury’s 2020 damages award of $1 billion finding Cox secondarily liable for its subscribers’ copyright infringement through illegal copying of copyrighted songs. Both Cox and Sony filed petitions for certiorari.

On Dec. 9, 2024, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Kousisis v. United States, a case that will again review the reach of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. At issue this time is the so-called “fraudulent inducement” theory of property fraud — namely, whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if the infliction of economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme.

The Supreme Court held that expert testimony in a criminal case, as to whether "most people" similar to the defendant have a particular mental state, does not run afoul of the Federal Rule of Evidence's prohibition against expert opinion evidence about whether a criminal defendant had or lacked the mental state required for conviction. Particularly in white-collar cases, where the defendant's intent is often the central disputed issue, the implications of Diaz may be far-reaching.