Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
A separation agreement is a contract subject to the principles of contract construction and interpretation. “Where the contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, the courts must determine the intent of the parties from within the four corners of the contract.” Meccico v. Meccico, 76 N.Y.2d 822, 823 (1990); see also Cappelli v. Cappelli, 286 A.D.2d 359 (2d Dept. 2001). Normally, the only way to change the agreement is by consent of all parties. Mancini v. Mancini, 236 A.D.2d 449 (2d Dept. 1997).
There appears to be no reason why the parties to a separation agreement cannot specifically provide in their agreement that a resumption of marital relations will not be deemed a reconciliation, and that the separation agreement will not be impaired or invalidated thereby unless a formal written document is executed by the parties acknowledging such reconciliation and affirmatively canceling the agreement. Indeed, such language is commonly found in separation agreements, and its obvious purpose is to avoid subsequent litigation in the event of a failed reconciliation attempt.
Under general contract law, statutory privileges are commonly contracted away. For example, a party may, with certain limitations, contractually give up the right to appeal. People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1 (1985) (a defendant waives right to appeals in exchange for guilty plea). This is true in the civil context as well, as in Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y. 2d 441 (1965), and Department of Soc. Servs. v. Herbert R., 213 A.D.2d 636 (2d Dept. 1995), in which the right to appeal was contracted/stipulated away.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?