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On April 4, 2003, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado rendered its decision in In re: Ashley Albright, Debtor, Case No. 01-11367 ABC, Chapter No. 7 (2003 Bankr. LEXIS 291). In the case of single-member LLCs, the Albright decision seriously weakens an important LLC business organization law feature often referred to by LLC practitioners as “business asset protection.” In the case of multi-member LLCs, the decision significantly strengthens this feature. As discussed below, the decision has important implications not only in entity formation practice generally but also for the VC/PE community.
First, a word about LLC business asset protection. Since as early as 1890, limited partnership statutes have contained provisions known as charging order provisions. Under these provisions, the judgment creditor of a limited partner debtor in default may obtain an order from a competent court requiring that if the partner's limited partnership determines to make interim or liquidating distributions of its cash or other assets to the partner, it must pay these distributions to the creditor, not the partner, to the extent of the unsatisfied judgment. Many decisions have held and a number of limited partnership statutes, including that of Delaware, expressly provide that charging order provisions are the exclusive remedy of such creditors and that creditors of limited partners who are debtors in default may not force the sale of limited partnership assets in satisfaction of the debt even if the limited partner is the limited partnership's majority owner.
LLC statutes did not begin to appear until many decades after the emergence of limited partnerships, but, with the exception of the LLC acts of Nebraska and Pennsylvania, all U.S. LLC statutes, based as they are on limited partnership law, contain charging order provisions. By contrast, no U.S. corporate statute contains such a provision. The statutory business asset protection that charging order provisions provide to LLC members is a major factor in making the LLC form preferable to the corporate form for most businesses from the viewpoint of nontax choice of entity. (The business asset protection feature of LLC statutes and their limited liability feature must be sharply distinguished. LLC business asset protection operates to protect an LLC's assets when a controlling member is subject to a judgment in the member's personal capacity. LLC limited liability protects the personal assets of LLC members when claims are brought against the LLC.)
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.