Merck's Strategy for Dealing with Vioxx: Why the Old Recipes for Success Won't Succeed

It seems that the same question is asked every time two pharmaceutical plaintiffs' lawyers get together these days: "Don't you think Merck can just pull a Baycol?" Referring to Bayer's strategy for resolving the recent litigation over Bayer's dangerous — and withdrawn — statin drug, these lawyers are concerned that Merck, like Bayer, can somehow escape compensating thousands of victims. No doubt due to the widely read article in The Wall Street Journal (May 3, 2004) that essentially gave Bayer an "academy award" for its handling of Baycol, reporters across the country, trying to analyze the emerging Merck debacle last fall, were asking the same question of their trial lawyer interviewees. What these inquiring minds are inquiring about is whether Merck, clearly faced with thousands of actions, can "lump and split" them. On the one side, Merck would place a very large pile of cases it deems non-compensable, and on the other, a much smaller pile comprised of those cases that Merck will agree to discuss and value. The answer to this question seems to be, at this relatively early date, that even if Merck wishes it could approach the problem this way, it cannot. Moreover, it cannot use the strategy it used in the phenylpropanolamine ("PPA"), Propulsid, or Rezulin litigation, either. In fact, any attempt to apply the strategies employed in those litigations may end in sheer disaster.