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Constitutional Thematics and the 'Peculiar' Federal Marriage Amendment
Editor's Note: For leading proponents and opponents of legalizing same-sex marriages in the United States, the legal arguments have been fairly well exhausted. Both sides are clear about where they stand on the issue, and why. So it is rare when an attorney or legal scholar looks at the issue with a fresh angle. At a symposium in September sponsored by the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University and the Marriage and Family Law Research Grant, Scott Dodson provided just such a surprise. In his presentation, excerpted here, Dodson, a Washington, DC, attorney, suggests that the proposed wording of the Federal Marriage Amendment is so broad that it would have an unprecedented effect on other constitutional values, and, without taking a stand on the issue of same-sex marriage, he suggests that more limited language would pose less danger to those values. Dodson's presentation will be published in full in the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law in Vol. 20, No. 2 Federal Marriage Amendment Symposium edition.
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, or FMA, in its current form, is two sentences. The first sentence states: “Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.” This sentence would prohibit any state from granting marital status to, or recognizing the marital status of, same-sex couples.
The second sentence states: “Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.” Another more recent version states: “No court of the United States or any State shall have jurisdiction to determine whether this Constitution or the constitution of any State requires that the legal incidents of marriage be conferred upon any union other than a legal union between one man and one woman.” Either way, this second sentence in the FMA prohibits a state from constitutionally preventing its own officials from denying same-sex couples the legal benefits of marriage.
Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 Opt In
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Legal Possession: What Does It Mean?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
The Stranger to the Deed Rule
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.