Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
In an article in the January, 2004, issue of The Matrimonial Strategist, I discussed the use of temporary support orders in a divorce action to allow the payor to deduct undifferentiated family support payments or for the purpose of paying debts, such as counsel fees, in light of a series of recent cases. The leading case disallowing the deduction of family support payments is Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002) (Colorado law; family support payments) but there are decisions involving the law of other states, mainly found in a series of Tax Court memorandum decisions. Some more recent cases now cast doubt on these precedents, leaving resolution of the issue uncertain, both for temporary orders, which by definition abate with the death of one of the parties to the pending divorce action, and for permanent marital settlements. They also raise the question whether an explicit termination provision would be effective if federal tax authorities conclude that the relevant state court would decide that the termination clause could not apply to the payor's child support obligation included within the support payments required by the order. A survey of state law reveals that this question is unresolved in almost every state, leaving the field wide open for federal tax determination of an important state law issue.
Taxable Alimony
Taxable alimony is defined in 71(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code to include all cash payments that: 1) are made under a divorce or separate instrument; 2) are not designated as not includible in income and not allowed as a deduction, 3) are made between divorced spouses who are not members of the same household; and 4) terminate on the death of the payee. The last of these requirements also requires that “there is no liability to make any payment as a substitute … ” for the alimony payments. Section 71(b)(1)(D) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, child support is not deductible, and child support is defined in section 71(c)(1) to be payments that are “ fixed … as a sum which is payable as child support.” This term is modified by section 71(c)(2) to include the amount of any payment that is a reduction in the obligation of the payor occurring “on the happening of a contingency relating to a child” or at a time “which can clearly be associated” with such a contingency. Amounts paid to an ex-spouse as “family support” can qualify as taxable alimony even when they include child support, so long as the child support portion is not “fixed” as defined in section 71(c). The question that seems to recur often in the cases is whether such an undifferentiated family support payment terminates on the death of the payee as required by section 71(b)(1)(D) when it includes child support, and the payor's obligation to support his or her children survives the payee's death, as it almost invariably will.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.