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Why CA's Anti-SLAPP Statute Should Apply to Peer Review

By David M. Axelrad and Jon B. Eisenberg
October 31, 2005

California law protects defendants from lawsuits designed to thwart “a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” The “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute provides this protection by permitting the defendant to move to strike the plaintiff's complaint at the outset of litigation unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., ' 425.16, subd. (e)).

The model SLAPP suit is one “'filed by a large land developer against environmental activists or a neighborhood association intended to chill the defendants' continued political or legal opposition to the developers' plans.'” Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1125, citing Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, overruled on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53. Section 425.16, however, has been applied to dismiss complaints in a wide range of other contexts. See, eg, Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (residential rental property owners' suit against nonprofit tenants' rights corporation); Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551 (public figures' suit against newspaper); Dove Audio Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777 (record publisher's suit against law firm); Averill v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1175 (home buyer's suit against seller). Since enactment of the anti-SLAPP statute, the question has arisen: What are the effects of the anti-SLAPP statute on peer review boards and their members when a disgruntled physician seeks to recover for injuries he feels the board's activities have caused him?

A Test Case

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