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Case Briefs
New Jersey's Verbal Threshold Standard Clarified, at Least for Now
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently resolved the longstanding controversy over the proper interpretation of the 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA” or “Act”), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to 35. See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508, 874 A.2d 1058 (2005). AICRA basically provides policyholders with the choice of lower insurance premium payments in exchange for limiting their right to sue for non-economic damages. The Act's relevant “limitation on lawsuit” threshold prevents recovery unless the injured claimant sustains a bodily injury that results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. It further provides that such injury will be regarded as permanent only when the involved body part has not healed, and will not heal, to function normally with further medical treatment. Id. To satisfy the Act's requirements, a claimant who has filed a bodily injury suit must, within a specified time frame, provide a physician's sworn certification that objective clinical evidence demonstrates that the claimant has sustained a permanent injury of the type specified in the Act. Id.
Before the Act's passage, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted an analogous “verbal threshold” provision ' contained in the 1988 New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act ' as requiring not only evidence that a claimant's injury fit within one of the categories described in that earlier statute, but also that the claimant had suffered a “serious life impact” as the result of the injury. See Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 318, 609 A.2d 415 (1992). Following AICRA's passage, the continued viability of the “serious life impact” analysis was challenged with mixed results. See James v. Torres, 354 N.J. Super. 586, 808 A.2d 873 (App.Div.2002) (holding the serious impact requirement of Oswin survived the passage of AICRA and was implicitly incorporated within it). But see Compere v. Collins, 352 N.J. Super. 200, 799 A.2d 721 (Law Div. 2002); DiProspero v. Penn, 2004 WL 439350, Slip Op. (App.Div. 2004) (Weissbard, J. dissenting).
Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 Opt In
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Legal Possession: What Does It Mean?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
The Stranger to the Deed Rule
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.