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Back Child Support
The Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) was enacted to promote New York's public policy concern that both parents contribute to their children's support — and in response to federal law that mandatory support guidelines be in effect as a predicate to eligibility for federal funding. Panossian v. Panossian, 201 A.D.2d 983 (4th Dept., 1994); Rakoszynski v. Rakoszynski, 174 Misc.2d 509 (1997). It is settled law that agreements that contract away the obligation to pay child support are void as against public policy and, thus, unenforceable. Strenge v. Bearman, 228 A.D.2d 664 (1996). Although seemingly straightforward, the narrowly defined statutory scheme regarding the retroactivity of child support has been indirectly, yet, significantly broadened as a result of recent judicial authority involving unrelated issues.
Statutory law provides that child support is “effective as of the date of the application therefore (DRL ' 236B(7), DRL ' 240(j), and FCA ' 449),” which leaves two categories of custodial parents severely constrained in any attempts to retrieve child support for unpaid periods: 1) those in Family Court seeking pre-application date support, and 2) those in post judgment/order proceedings (in Supreme or Family Court) following a de facto change of custody where the new custodial parent seeks support for the gap of time between the actual change of custody and the application for support. While parents in divorce actions with no extant support awards have recourse for back support via a cause of action in necessaries, relief is now newly available to the two aforementioned categories of parents who would otherwise have continued to remain hamstrung in their efforts to obtain child support.
In a seeming departure from strict statutory construction a parent's failure to pay child support may now very well be the dominant factor in determining the effective retroactive date to which an award may be made. It may be argued that recent decisional authority from the Court of Appeals now permits the expansion of the recovery period for child support to the date that the parent terminated child support, even if that time antedates the application to the court. This apparent change requires an analysis of whether the Court of Appeals has tacitly reversed its holding in Nichols v. Nichols, 306 NY 490 (1954).
Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 Opt In
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Legal Possession: What Does It Mean?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
The Stranger to the Deed Rule
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.