Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
On Aug. 29, 2006, Hurricane Katrina, one of the deadliest and costliest natural disasters ever to strike the United States, hit New Orleans and Mississippi. With winds recorded at over 135 mph, the hurricane caused severe damage to much of New Orleans and the surrounding areas. The worst was yet to come, however. Following the storm, the levees built to protect the city, which is mostly below sea level, failed to retain the water. This resulted in more than 80% of the city being flooded. This catastrophic flooding caused billions in damages and sparked the current storm of insurance coverage litigation.
Due to the crippling costs associated with flood insurance, most homeowner policies specifically exclude damages caused by flood. See 42 U.S.C. '4001(b) ('[M]any factors have made it uneconomic for the private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such protection on reasonable terms and conditions.'). Because the private insurance industry could not provide flood insurance to homeowners on an economically feasible basis, Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program ('NFIP') in 1968. This program offered property owners a relatively low-cost option to cover their property in the event of a flood. See 44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. A. Unfortunately, these residential dwelling flood policies are capped at $250,000 for dwellings and $100,000 for contents. Many policyholders who obtained this coverage found themselves significantly underinsured for the damages to their property. Many others, inexplicably, never bought flood coverage in the first place.
Some policyholders left without sufficient flood insurance coverage are now seeking to hold their homeowner insurer liable for the flood damage by attacking the well-recognized validity of the water damage exclusions in their homeowner policies. A highly anticipated decision concerning many of the issues presented in this article is expected soon from federal Judge Stanwood R. Duval, Jr. of the Eastern District of Louisiana. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, C.A. No. 05-4182 (E.D. La.).
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.