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A recent decision of the Appellate Division, First Department, addressed the rights of matrimonial litigants to shield their identities from publication in reported decisions. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 27 A.D.3d 356 (1st Dept 2006), the court, citing People v. Jones, 47 NY2d 409 (1979), held that judicial approval of anonymous captions in divorce actions should be granted 'sparingly' and 'only when unusual circumstances necessitate it.' Earlier decisions of trial and appellate courts have manifested a judicial policy to allow anonymous captions only when necessary to promote some public interest, including the need to safeguard the health and welfare of children.
By way of example, courts have allowed the use of an anonymous caption in custody matters when necessary to safeguard the best interests of children (see, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 158 AD2d 296 (1st Dep't 1990), and refused such requests where the contested issues primarily concerned the parties' finances (see, Merrick v. Merrick, 154 Misc2d 559 (Sup. Ct., NY Cty. 1992)). The court in Anonymous, supra, denied plaintiff's request to disallow public attendance at the proceedings based upon 'unsupported speculation' of the negative effect media coverage might cause to the children, yet allowed the use of an anonymous caption to promote the children's long-term interests. In Merrick, the court noted that, although the wife had asserted a potential deleterious effect on the children in the absence of an anonymous caption, she had failed to support her claim beyond mere assertion.
When addressing rights to privacy in litigation, matrimonial courts have grappled with such additional issues as the parties' rights to: 1) closure of the courtroom; 2) restraints on the use of out-of-court statements; 3) sealing of records; and 4) protection of matrimonial records from disclosure in non-matrimonial litigation. Each of these could come up in your practice at various times, as when a client expresses concerns for his or her privacy, the privacy of the children or the confidentiality of business information.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.