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Antitrust practitioners and companies worried about antitrust prosecution are weighing the significance of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), which held that the Department of Justice (DOJ) could still prosecute a company after it had been accepted into the Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Program. Under the Program, adopted in 1993, a company engaged in antitrust violations that qualifies for leniency will not be prosecuted, provided that it confesses its wrongdoing, agrees to cooperate in an investigation of co-conspirators, and makes restitution to victims of its illegal conduct. The Program offers protection from both criminal prosecution and treble damages in subsequent civil antitrust suits.
But there's a catch. Amnesty is available only to the first company in a given cartel or conspiracy that cooperates with the Division. The second company in the door is not guaranteed anything, no matter how extensive its cooperation, and it may wind up with no leniency at all. This 'winner take all' policy creates a rush to the prosecutor's office to report illegal conduct.
The DOJ's Criminal Division issued three declinations since the issuance of the revised CEP a year ago. Review of these cases gives insight into DOJ's implementation of the new policy in practice.
The parameters set forth in the DOJ's memorandum have implications not only for the government's evaluation of compliance programs in the context of criminal charging decisions, but also for how defense counsel structure their conference-room advocacy seeking declinations or lesser sanctions in both criminal and civil investigations.
This article discusses the practical and policy reasons for the use of DPAs and NPAs in white-collar criminal investigations, and considers the NDAA's new reporting provision and its relationship with other efforts to enhance transparency in DOJ decision-making.
Active reading comprises many daily tasks lawyers engage in, including highlighting, annotating, note taking, comparing and searching texts. It demands more than flipping or turning pages.
There is no efficient market for the sale of bankruptcy assets. Inefficient markets yield a transactional drag, potentially dampening the ability of debtors and trustees to maximize value for creditors. This article identifies ways in which investors may more easily discover bankruptcy asset sales.