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A biting satire it may not have been, but Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007), nonetheless concluded that canine chew toys fashioned after Louis Vuitton handbags were a permitted parody that did not infringe or dilute Louis Vuitton's admittedly well-known marks. Although the decision scratches little new ground in the trademark jurisprudence of parody and infringement, it was a first opportunity for an appellate court to assess parody under the new Trademark Dilution Revision Act. The court here squarely rejected a concerted, if not to say dogged, effort by Vuitton and its amicus, the International Trademark Association, which both urged a position that, in the words of the court, would 'automatically' have made parodies unlawful. Id. at 264.
The parameters set forth in the DOJ's memorandum have implications not only for the government's evaluation of compliance programs in the context of criminal charging decisions, but also for how defense counsel structure their conference-room advocacy seeking declinations or lesser sanctions in both criminal and civil investigations.
The DOJ's Criminal Division issued three declinations since the issuance of the revised CEP a year ago. Review of these cases gives insight into DOJ's implementation of the new policy in practice.
This article discusses the practical and policy reasons for the use of DPAs and NPAs in white-collar criminal investigations, and considers the NDAA's new reporting provision and its relationship with other efforts to enhance transparency in DOJ decision-making.
There is no efficient market for the sale of bankruptcy assets. Inefficient markets yield a transactional drag, potentially dampening the ability of debtors and trustees to maximize value for creditors. This article identifies ways in which investors may more easily discover bankruptcy asset sales.
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower courts' judgment that a "transfer made … in connection with a securities contract … by a qualifying financial institution" was entitled "to the protection of ... §546 (e)'s safe harbor ...."