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On March 3, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of Cuellar v. United States. The decision, expected by the end of June, will interpret the 'intent to conceal' provision of the federal Anti-Money Laundering statutes. Specifically, the question presented is whether hiding illicit crime proceeds absent a design to create the appearance that the proceeds were derived from legitimate wealth violates section 18 U.S.C. ' 1956 (a)(2)(B)(i), which makes it an offense to transport crime proceeds across an international border with the intent to conceal or disguise. Before reaching the Supreme Court, the question was answered Yes by the district court, No by a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit, then Yes by the circuit sitting en banc.
The Facts
The facts presented at trial established that Humberto Fidel Regalado Cuellar was stopped while traveling on Route 277 South toward his home in the border town of Acuna, Mexico. The County Sheriff pulled Cuellar over because his car was traveling 40 mph in a 70 mph zone and had veered onto the shoulder of the road. Cuellar was in possession of $2,275, which the arresting officers testified smelled of marijuana. A canine unit was called to the scene and, while waiting, the officers searched the car with Cuellar's consent. Their search revealed that the car had been altered in a way consistent with other cars used to transport narcotics, and contained animal hair ' a known method used to distract drug-detection dogs. When the dog arrived, it 'alerted' on an area behind the driver's seat, where officers found a hidden compartment that contained more than $80,000 in U.S. currency in all denominations.
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