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The Appellate Court of Illinois decided that a license to use the trademark 'March Madness' 'to advertise, promote, and sell publications, videos, and media broadcasts' included the right to deliver on-demand video content to mobile wireless devices. Intersport Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1-07-0626. Intersport, which produces sports programming, obtained a license in 1995 to use 'March Madness.' The sports programmer filed a declaratory action after entering into a deal in 2006 to deliver its video content to Sprint cell-phone customers.
The appellate court found the term 'media broadcast' in the license was limited to radio and TV distribution. But the court also noted 'that as early as 1979, the dissemination of video content to mobile wireless communication devices was foreseeable and that the term 'video' was used to refer to that content.
'We also find it significant that Intersport's license is exclusive and perpetual. The fact that there is no time limitation on the license, and no clause specifically excluding later-developed technology, suggests that the terms of the license should be interpreted broadly. ' [In addition,] it cannot be said that the term 'videos' is in any way modified or limited by the term 'media broadcasts.”
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