Decisions of Interest

Support Magistrate Cannot Change Terms of This
Separation Agreement

Because the woman in this in this separation action was not likely to become a public charge, the Support Magistrate who ordered her husband to continue paying her spousal support after such support had terminated in accordance with the parties' separation agreement was without jurisdiction to make such order. Matter of B.J.G. v. I.R.G., F-6335-07 (Fam. Ct., Orange Cty. 7/16/08 (Kiedaisch, J.).

The parties separated pursuant to a separation agreement that required the husband to pay child support and spousal support, although the spousal support was to last only 18 months. Both parties were represented by counsel at the time of the agreement's drafting and signing. The husband, who made approximately $100,000 per year, lived up to all the terms of the agreement. The wife, who made approximately $25,000 per year, found that she was having trouble making ends meet once her spousal support payments ceased, as she had only $85 left after accounting for her expenses each month. Therefore, she sought continuing spousal support. The Support Magistrate ordered the husband to pay the wife $500 per month in spousal support, and the husband filed an objection.

The court noted that the husband was paying the agreed-upon child support of $2,541 per month, which equaled the amount required to pay the mortgage, insurance and other costs for the marital home. Thus, the wife's housing costs will be paid until such time as the last child, who is now eight years old, is emancipated. By the terms of the agreement, if the house is then sold she will get half the proceeds. The husband was also required under the separation agreement's terms to maintain health insurance for the children until their emancipation and to pay childcare and unreimbursed health care for the children in proportion to the ratio between his and his wife's income. After paying these and his other expenses, the husband was left with about $2,900 per month ' certainly much more than his wife's $85. Nevertheless, Family Court noted that in a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals, Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364, it was held that the Family Court, being a court of limited jurisdiction and unable to exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute, lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify the spousal support provisions of a valid separation agreement except where, as expressly provided by Family Court Act (FCA) 463, the spouse seeking an order granting financial support is likely to become in need of public assistance or care.

The wife here, seeking to defend the Support Magistrate's order, stated that the fact that she was left with only $85 per month after expenses clearly indicated that she was likely to become a public charge. She also submitted as proof that she was indeed a “public charge” the fact that she was receiving “Home Energy Assistance Program” benefits from Orange County. Family Court was unpersuaded. Stated the court, “The petitioner's monthly shelter costs and her health care insurance coverage are currently fully provided for by [the husband] pursuant to the separation agreement. There is no showing based on the record in this proceeding that petitioner is about to become a public charge. That petitioner testified she received benefits from a government program which by its title appears to be aimed at helping with the costs of home energy does not demonstrate that petitioner is receiving that degree of public monies to bring her within the meaning of receiving “public assistance” as used in the statute to permit the Family Court to disregard the parties' separation agreement (FCA 463).”

Support Magistrate Cannot Change Terms of This
Separation Agreement

Because the woman in this in this separation action was not likely to become a public charge, the Support Magistrate who ordered her husband to continue paying her spousal support after such support had terminated in accordance with the parties' separation agreement was without jurisdiction to make such order. Matter of B.J.G. v. I.R.G., F-6335-07 (Fam. Ct., Orange Cty. 7/16/08 (Kiedaisch, J.).

The parties separated pursuant to a separation agreement that required the husband to pay child support and spousal support, although the spousal support was to last only 18 months. Both parties were represented by counsel at the time of the agreement's drafting and signing. The husband, who made approximately $100,000 per year, lived up to all the terms of the agreement. The wife, who made approximately $25,000 per year, found that she was having trouble making ends meet once her spousal support payments ceased, as she had only $85 left after accounting for her expenses each month. Therefore, she sought continuing spousal support. The Support Magistrate ordered the husband to pay the wife $500 per month in spousal support, and the husband filed an objection.

The court noted that the husband was paying the agreed-upon child support of $2,541 per month, which equaled the amount required to pay the mortgage, insurance and other costs for the marital home. Thus, the wife's housing costs will be paid until such time as the last child, who is now eight years old, is emancipated. By the terms of the agreement, if the house is then sold she will get half the proceeds. The husband was also required under the separation agreement's terms to maintain health insurance for the children until their emancipation and to pay childcare and unreimbursed health care for the children in proportion to the ratio between his and his wife's income. After paying these and his other expenses, the husband was left with about $2,900 per month ' certainly much more than his wife's $85. Nevertheless, Family Court noted that in a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals, Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S. , 10 NY3d 364, it was held that the Family Court, being a court of limited jurisdiction and unable to exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute, lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify the spousal support provisions of a valid separation agreement except where, as expressly provided by Family Court Act (FCA) 463, the spouse seeking an order granting financial support is likely to become in need of public assistance or care.

The wife here, seeking to defend the Support Magistrate's order, stated that the fact that she was left with only $85 per month after expenses clearly indicated that she was likely to become a public charge. She also submitted as proof that she was indeed a “public charge” the fact that she was receiving “Home Energy Assistance Program” benefits from Orange County. Family Court was unpersuaded. Stated the court, “The petitioner's monthly shelter costs and her health care insurance coverage are currently fully provided for by [the husband] pursuant to the separation agreement. There is no showing based on the record in this proceeding that petitioner is about to become a public charge. That petitioner testified she received benefits from a government program which by its title appears to be aimed at helping with the costs of home energy does not demonstrate that petitioner is receiving that degree of public monies to bring her within the meaning of receiving “public assistance” as used in the statute to permit the Family Court to disregard the parties' separation agreement (FCA 463).”