NJ & CT News

New Jersey

Malpractice Claim Against Matrimonial Firm Reinstated

New Jersey's Appellate Division ruled in August in Schachter, Trombadore, Offen, Stanton & Pavics v. Peters, A-3174-06, that a client's claim for legal malpractice against her divorce attorneys was not barred by collateral estoppel even though she had exhausted her attempts to amend the final judgment of divorce and qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The plaintiff, Trudi Peters, claimed in her suit that her divorce attorney firm ' Schachter, Trombadore, Offen, Stanton & Pavics ' engaged an incompetent pension specialist to draft her QDRO. The trial court dismissed her malpractice claim, relying on Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428 (2005), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court said clients who attest to the fairness of matrimonial settlements and then renounce them cannot sustain malpractice claims. Reversing, the Appellate Division said the trail court should have relied on Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250 (1992), in which the State Supreme Court allowed a claim to go forward even though the client accepted a settlement that could have been considered fair. The judges here said Peters was given no real power to reject the pension specialist's appointment and the QDRO. Under Ziegelheim, the appeals court said, it was error for the lower court to hold that the prior litigation resolved whether the QDRO effectuated the intent of the parties.

Connecticut

Order Modifying Child Support Was Temporary, Not Final

The Connecticut Appellate Court found that a trial court improperly deemed a magistrate's temporary order a final order, when in fact the temporary order was an authorized mechanism the magistrate could employ to allow the father to secure employment before a permanent support amount was set. The father had moved for modification of his support obligation based on a substantial change in his financial circumstances after he lost his job. In March 2004, family support magistrate Susan Baran reduced, on a temporary basis, the child support order from $267 per week for three children to $128 per week for two children. The matter was continued until the father's new employment was scheduled to start, in June 2004. Later, the father challenged the constitutionality of the temporary order, citing to Connecticut General Statute (C.G.S.) '46b-86 (a), and arguing that a final order had entered in March 2004. In response, the magistrate concluded that temporary orders were authorized, and a higher support amount was set. That higher amount was applied retroactively to March 2004. The father appealed. The court reversed the decision, finding that the March 2004 order was in effect a modification of the existing child support order and that the June 2006 retroactive order was thus improper. The Appellate Court reversed, finding that the plain language of C.G.S. 46b-86 (a) permits retroactive modification of a support order if there is a pending motion. Magistrate Baran had issued a temporary order to provide immediate, limited relief to the defendant until he could obtain employment, but the initial motion remained undecided and, thus, was still pending for purposes of retroactivity. The case is Esposito v. Banning, No.: AC 28661 (Conn. App. 9/23/08).

New Jersey

Malpractice Claim Against Matrimonial Firm Reinstated

New Jersey's Appellate Division ruled in August in Schachter, Trombadore, Offen, Stanton & Pavics v. Peters, A-3174-06, that a client's claim for legal malpractice against her divorce attorneys was not barred by collateral estoppel even though she had exhausted her attempts to amend the final judgment of divorce and qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The plaintiff, Trudi Peters, claimed in her suit that her divorce attorney firm ' Schachter, Trombadore, Offen, Stanton & Pavics ' engaged an incompetent pension specialist to draft her QDRO. The trial court dismissed her malpractice claim, relying on Puder v. Buechel , 183 N.J. 428 (2005), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court said clients who attest to the fairness of matrimonial settlements and then renounce them cannot sustain malpractice claims. Reversing, the Appellate Division said the trail court should have relied on Ziegelheim v. Apollo , 128 N.J. 250 (1992), in which the State Supreme Court allowed a claim to go forward even though the client accepted a settlement that could have been considered fair. The judges here said Peters was given no real power to reject the pension specialist's appointment and the QDRO. Under Ziegelheim, the appeals court said, it was error for the lower court to hold that the prior litigation resolved whether the QDRO effectuated the intent of the parties.

Connecticut

Order Modifying Child Support Was Temporary, Not Final

The Connecticut Appellate Court found that a trial court improperly deemed a magistrate's temporary order a final order, when in fact the temporary order was an authorized mechanism the magistrate could employ to allow the father to secure employment before a permanent support amount was set. The father had moved for modification of his support obligation based on a substantial change in his financial circumstances after he lost his job. In March 2004, family support magistrate Susan Baran reduced, on a temporary basis, the child support order from $267 per week for three children to $128 per week for two children. The matter was continued until the father's new employment was scheduled to start, in June 2004. Later, the father challenged the constitutionality of the temporary order, citing to Connecticut General Statute (C.G.S.) '46b-86 (a), and arguing that a final order had entered in March 2004. In response, the magistrate concluded that temporary orders were authorized, and a higher support amount was set. That higher amount was applied retroactively to March 2004. The father appealed. The court reversed the decision, finding that the March 2004 order was in effect a modification of the existing child support order and that the June 2006 retroactive order was thus improper. The Appellate Court reversed, finding that the plain language of C.G.S. 46b-86 (a) permits retroactive modification of a support order if there is a pending motion. Magistrate Baran had issued a temporary order to provide immediate, limited relief to the defendant until he could obtain employment, but the initial motion remained undecided and, thus, was still pending for purposes of retroactivity. The case is Esposito v. Banning, No.: AC 28661 (Conn. App. 9/23/08).