NJ & CT News

New Jersey

NJ Court Grants Same-Sex Couple Divorce

Citing comity, a New Jersey judge determined on Feb. 6 that two women could be divorced in New Jersey. The state does not allow same-sex partners to marry, but the women, who lived there, were legally married in British Columbia, Canada, in 2004. When one of them wanted to divorce, she was unable to do so in Canada because of that country's two-year residency requirement for divorce. She therefore sought a divorce in New Jersey.

In February 2007, Attorney General Stuart Rabner had issued formal opinion No. 3-2007, which says the state does not recognize same-sex marriages performed in other countries, but instead treats them as civil unions. Based on this, the state Attorney General's Office intervened in the women's divorce action, asking the court to grant not a divorce, but a dissolution of a civil union. Mercer County Superior Court Judge Mary Jacobson ruled the women could divorce in New Jersey, noting that the state's argument was contrary to New Jersey's long-standing recognition of marriages entered into in other states and countries, if such marriages are valid in those jurisdictions. “What she [the plaintiff] needs, having a valid marriage, is a divorce,” Jacobson said. “You don't end a marriage with dissolution of a civil union,” the judge said, noting that the divorcing women might not be free to remarry in Canada if they could present only proof of dissolution of a civil union rather than divorce. Judge Jacobson emphasized that her ruling does not confer recognition on gay marriage in New Jersey.

Connecticut

Nominal Alimony Award Not Evidence of Punishment

The Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a decision ordering a former husband to pay his former wife $1 per year alimony was not conclusive evidence that the court intentionally imposed an impossible financial order as a means of punishing him. Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn.App. 631, 963 A.2d 1049 (2/17/09).

During trial, the husband engaged in apparent “litigation misconduct,” which consisted of: 1) his execution of a second promissory note and mortgage on the marital home to defraud the court and his wife; 2) his absorption of 100% of the costs of a business, in which he was a 50% shareholder; 3) his sale of certain assets to his brother; 4) his inconsistent reporting of income to the court; and 5) this making a custody claim in the final hour of trial.

The trial court, finding that the husband's estate was worth in excess of $2 million, ordered him to pay his wife child support, alimony and other payments. It also ordered him to pay nominal alimony of $1 per year “until such time as the property settlement [entered by the court was] paid in full and the liens and encumbrances on the [marital home], which the defendant is obligated to indemnify on account of [the property settlement was] paid in full and, or, released, or he exercises his option to purchase the residence and acreage.” It further stated that the order of $1 per year alimony would be “modifiable to the extent necessary to ensure that the defendant satisfies all of his obligations” under the property settlement, periodic alimony and lump sum alimony orders.

On appeal, the husband averred that the $1 nominal alimony payment requirement served as evidence that the trial court had improperly constructed a property division and support award with which it knew he could not comply, simply in order to punish him for his litigation misconduct. The Appellate Court of Connecticut disagreed, noting that an award of a nominal sum of ongoing alimony is a way of preserving jurisdiction of the court over the matter, should adjustments to payments be required later due to changes in circumstances. Thus, the court's decision to order $1 million per year alimony to the wife was not conclusive evidence that the court intentionally imposed an impossible financial order to punish the defendant. Concluded the court, “[The trial] court's decision to maintain its jurisdiction on any future modifications of the periodic alimony award is well within its discretion.”

New Jersey

NJ Court Grants Same-Sex Couple Divorce

Citing comity, a New Jersey judge determined on Feb. 6 that two women could be divorced in New Jersey. The state does not allow same-sex partners to marry, but the women, who lived there, were legally married in British Columbia, Canada, in 2004. When one of them wanted to divorce, she was unable to do so in Canada because of that country's two-year residency requirement for divorce. She therefore sought a divorce in New Jersey.

In February 2007, Attorney General Stuart Rabner had issued formal opinion No. 3-2007, which says the state does not recognize same-sex marriages performed in other countries, but instead treats them as civil unions. Based on this, the state Attorney General's Office intervened in the women's divorce action, asking the court to grant not a divorce, but a dissolution of a civil union. Mercer County Superior Court Judge Mary Jacobson ruled the women could divorce in New Jersey, noting that the state's argument was contrary to New Jersey's long-standing recognition of marriages entered into in other states and countries, if such marriages are valid in those jurisdictions. “What she [the plaintiff] needs, having a valid marriage, is a divorce,” Jacobson said. “You don't end a marriage with dissolution of a civil union,” the judge said, noting that the divorcing women might not be free to remarry in Canada if they could present only proof of dissolution of a civil union rather than divorce. Judge Jacobson emphasized that her ruling does not confer recognition on gay marriage in New Jersey.

Connecticut

Nominal Alimony Award Not Evidence of Punishment

The Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a decision ordering a former husband to pay his former wife $1 per year alimony was not conclusive evidence that the court intentionally imposed an impossible financial order as a means of punishing him. Utz v. Utz , 112 Conn.App. 631, 963 A.2d 1049 (2/17/09).

During trial, the husband engaged in apparent “litigation misconduct,” which consisted of: 1) his execution of a second promissory note and mortgage on the marital home to defraud the court and his wife; 2) his absorption of 100% of the costs of a business, in which he was a 50% shareholder; 3) his sale of certain assets to his brother; 4) his inconsistent reporting of income to the court; and 5) this making a custody claim in the final hour of trial.

The trial court, finding that the husband's estate was worth in excess of $2 million, ordered him to pay his wife child support, alimony and other payments. It also ordered him to pay nominal alimony of $1 per year “until such time as the property settlement [entered by the court was] paid in full and the liens and encumbrances on the [marital home], which the defendant is obligated to indemnify on account of [the property settlement was] paid in full and, or, released, or he exercises his option to purchase the residence and acreage.” It further stated that the order of $1 per year alimony would be “modifiable to the extent necessary to ensure that the defendant satisfies all of his obligations” under the property settlement, periodic alimony and lump sum alimony orders.

On appeal, the husband averred that the $1 nominal alimony payment requirement served as evidence that the trial court had improperly constructed a property division and support award with which it knew he could not comply, simply in order to punish him for his litigation misconduct. The Appellate Court of Connecticut disagreed, noting that an award of a nominal sum of ongoing alimony is a way of preserving jurisdiction of the court over the matter, should adjustments to payments be required later due to changes in circumstances. Thus, the court's decision to order $1 million per year alimony to the wife was not conclusive evidence that the court intentionally imposed an impossible financial order to punish the defendant. Concluded the court, “[The trial] court's decision to maintain its jurisdiction on any future modifications of the periodic alimony award is well within its discretion.”