Law.com Subscribers SAVE 30%

Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.

High Court Dismisses Philip Morris Appeal of $79 Million Punitive Damages Verdict

By Tony Mauro
April 27, 2009

On March 31, the U.S. Supreme Court blinked in a long-running standoff with the Oregon Supreme Court over the handling of a punitive damages suit against Philip Morris brought by the widow of a smoker who died from lung cancer in 1997. The high court dismissed the case of Philip Morris v. Williams as “improvidently granted”in a one-sentence opinion. As a result, the widow, Mayola Williams, stands to receive at least some portion of the $79 million verdict, which has grown to $150 million with interest.

When such a dismissal comes soon after oral argument, it often means the justices have discovered a defect in the case that makes it an inappropriate vehicle to decide the issue. When, as here, the dismissal comes nearly four months after argument, it could mean that after several tries, no majority of the justices coalesced around a single position.

Background

The case went before the Supreme Court three times and was sent back to Oregon's Supreme Court twice ' each time resulting in the Oregon judges reaffirming the verdict. The last time the high court remanded it to Oregon was in 2007 with instructions to be sure the verdict was not punishing Philip Morris for injuries to anyone other than Jesse Williams, Mayola's husband. The Oregon supreme court responded by reaffirming the verdict again, but based on an independent state ground that had not been invoked before.

That led Philip Morris and its allies in business groups to paint the Oregon Supreme Court as a renegade court that was defying the U.S. Supreme Court's judgments. However, that assertion seemed to lose steam during oral arguments in December. If the justices were divided on the legitimacy of the Oregon court's latest ruling as well as on the merits of the case, it may have proven impossible to form a majority, says Richard Samp, chief counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, which supported Philip Morris.

Comments

Robert Peck of the Center for Constitutional Litigation in D.C., who argued on Mayola Williams' behalf, says she was “thrilled, overjoyed,” at the news of the Supreme Court's action. “She hasn't gotten a dollar of the judgment,” Peck says, and will get a substantial portion, though Philip Morris may challenge some of it on other grounds.

Mayer Brown's Stephen Shapiro, who argued the case for Philip Morris, referred questions to Altria, the parent company, which issued a statement from Murray Garnick, associate general counsel: “While we had hoped for a different outcome, the Supreme Court has decided not to review a narrow procedural ruling by the state court. Today's decision does not impact the court's earlier decisions on punitive damages.”


Tony Mauro is the Supreme Court Correspondent for the New York Law Journal, an Incisive Media sister publication of this newsletter in which this article first appeared.

On March 31, the U.S. Supreme Court blinked in a long-running standoff with the Oregon Supreme Court over the handling of a punitive damages suit against Philip Morris brought by the widow of a smoker who died from lung cancer in 1997. The high court dismissed the case of Philip Morris v. Williams as “improvidently granted”in a one-sentence opinion. As a result, the widow, Mayola Williams, stands to receive at least some portion of the $79 million verdict, which has grown to $150 million with interest.

When such a dismissal comes soon after oral argument, it often means the justices have discovered a defect in the case that makes it an inappropriate vehicle to decide the issue. When, as here, the dismissal comes nearly four months after argument, it could mean that after several tries, no majority of the justices coalesced around a single position.

Background

The case went before the Supreme Court three times and was sent back to Oregon's Supreme Court twice ' each time resulting in the Oregon judges reaffirming the verdict. The last time the high court remanded it to Oregon was in 2007 with instructions to be sure the verdict was not punishing Philip Morris for injuries to anyone other than Jesse Williams, Mayola's husband. The Oregon supreme court responded by reaffirming the verdict again, but based on an independent state ground that had not been invoked before.

That led Philip Morris and its allies in business groups to paint the Oregon Supreme Court as a renegade court that was defying the U.S. Supreme Court's judgments. However, that assertion seemed to lose steam during oral arguments in December. If the justices were divided on the legitimacy of the Oregon court's latest ruling as well as on the merits of the case, it may have proven impossible to form a majority, says Richard Samp, chief counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, which supported Philip Morris.

Comments

Robert Peck of the Center for Constitutional Litigation in D.C., who argued on Mayola Williams' behalf, says she was “thrilled, overjoyed,” at the news of the Supreme Court's action. “She hasn't gotten a dollar of the judgment,” Peck says, and will get a substantial portion, though Philip Morris may challenge some of it on other grounds.

Mayer Brown's Stephen Shapiro, who argued the case for Philip Morris, referred questions to Altria, the parent company, which issued a statement from Murray Garnick, associate general counsel: “While we had hoped for a different outcome, the Supreme Court has decided not to review a narrow procedural ruling by the state court. Today's decision does not impact the court's earlier decisions on punitive damages.”


Tony Mauro is the Supreme Court Correspondent for the New York Law Journal, an Incisive Media sister publication of this newsletter in which this article first appeared.

This premium content is locked for Entertainment Law & Finance subscribers only

  • Stay current on the latest information, rulings, regulations, and trends
  • Includes practical, must-have information on copyrights, royalties, AI, and more
  • Tap into expert guidance from top entertainment lawyers and experts

For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473

Read These Next
Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws Image

This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.

The Article 8 Opt In Image

The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.

Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin Image

With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.

Legal Possession: What Does It Mean? Image

Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.

The Stranger to the Deed Rule Image

In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.