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NJ & CT News
New Jersey
Order of Specific Performance Not Prohibited in Pet Custody Matter
An appellate court judge has ruled that a New Jersey trial court erred in concluding specific performance was not an available remedy for breach of an oral agreement concerning a separating couple's pet. The case involved an unmarried couple who, after living together for some years, purchased a pedigreed dog for $1,500 in 2003. When the woman, Doreen Houseman, moved out in July 2006, she took the dog with her. She said that she and her ex-fianc', Eric Dare, had agreed that she would keep the dog, although Dare was allowed to visit with the dog and took care of it when Houseman was away. When Houseman left the dog with Dare in early 2007 while she was out of town, he refused to return it to her on her return. She immediately brought suit seeking specific performance of the oral agreement. Prior to trial, the court determined that pets are personal property that lack the unique value essential to an award of specific performance. The Family Part therefore awarded Houseman $1,500, in lieu of ordering the dog returned to her. Houseman appealed.
The appellate court noted that Houseman's actions in promptly seeking specific performance of the alleged oral agreement were evidence that money damages would not make her whole, despite the fact that she had stipulated to the dog's $1,500 value before trial. At the same time, Dare offered no proof that an order for specific performance would be harsh or oppressive to him, would reward Houseman for unfair conduct or violate public policy. In fact, said the court, if there was an oral agreement, it would be wrong to award Dare possession of the dog simply because he had physical possession of it at the time of trial. The panel therefore remanded for further proceedings concerning the existence of an oral agreement and the propriety of an order of specific performance. The case is Houseman v. Dare, A-2415-07T2, On appeal from the Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, FM-08-667-07. [Sat below: Judge Tomasello.] DDS No. 20-2-3009.
Connecticut
Lack of Well-Reasoned Record in Child Support Case Not Fatal to Appeal
Usually, when an appeal is taken from a decision in which the trial court did not adequately explain its reasoning, the appellant must first seek an articulation from the trial court so that the appellate court will have something concrete to work with. In March, however, the Appellate Court of Connecticut, when faced with an unexplained deviation from the child support guidelines, held that the trail court abused its discretion, despite the fact that the appellant failed to seek an articulation.
The wife in the case of Wallbeoff v. Wallbeoff, — A.2d —-, 113 Conn.App. 107, 2009 WL 564216 (Conn.App.), had been ordered by Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, to pay alimony and child support to the husband. However, as both parties agreed, the child support award deviated from the amounts set forth in the statutory child support guidelines, and the trial court failed to clarify on the record the basis for that deviation as required by ' 46b-215a-3(a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
The wife appealed the award and the husband answered by arguing that the appellate court should decline to review the financial orders because the trial court did not state the basis for its award and the wife failed to fulfill her responsibility to create a reviewable record by moving for an articulation. The appellate court chose to decide the case, however, and found that the Superior Court abused its discretion by deviating from the child support guidelines without explaining the reasons for the deviation on the record. The court determined that the lack of a well-reasoned explanation in the record was unnecessary in this case because, although it agreed with the defendant that “our rules normally place the burden of moving for an articulation on the appellant” should such clarification be necessary, it was obvious here that the lower court had failed in its duty to comply with the requirements of ' 46b-215a-3(a). Because the record was clear and unambiguous as to the absence of the required findings, the record was adequate for the appellate court's review of the issue on appeal.
New Jersey
Order of Specific Performance Not Prohibited in Pet Custody Matter
An appellate court judge has ruled that a New Jersey trial court erred in concluding specific performance was not an available remedy for breach of an oral agreement concerning a separating couple's pet. The case involved an unmarried couple who, after living together for some years, purchased a pedigreed dog for $1,500 in 2003. When the woman, Doreen Houseman, moved out in July 2006, she took the dog with her. She said that she and her ex-fianc', Eric Dare, had agreed that she would keep the dog, although Dare was allowed to visit with the dog and took care of it when Houseman was away. When Houseman left the dog with Dare in early 2007 while she was out of town, he refused to return it to her on her return. She immediately brought suit seeking specific performance of the oral agreement. Prior to trial, the court determined that pets are personal property that lack the unique value essential to an award of specific performance. The Family Part therefore awarded Houseman $1,500, in lieu of ordering the dog returned to her. Houseman appealed.
The appellate court noted that Houseman's actions in promptly seeking specific performance of the alleged oral agreement were evidence that money damages would not make her whole, despite the fact that she had stipulated to the dog's $1,500 value before trial. At the same time, Dare offered no proof that an order for specific performance would be harsh or oppressive to him, would reward Houseman for unfair conduct or violate public policy. In fact, said the court, if there was an oral agreement, it would be wrong to award Dare possession of the dog simply because he had physical possession of it at the time of trial. The panel therefore remanded for further proceedings concerning the existence of an oral agreement and the propriety of an order of specific performance. The case is Houseman v. Dare, A-2415-07T2, On appeal from the Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, FM-08-667-07. [Sat below: Judge Tomasello.] DDS No. 20-2-3009.
Connecticut
Lack of Well-Reasoned Record in Child Support Case Not Fatal to Appeal
Usually, when an appeal is taken from a decision in which the trial court did not adequately explain its reasoning, the appellant must first seek an articulation from the trial court so that the appellate court will have something concrete to work with. In March, however, the Appellate Court of Connecticut, when faced with an unexplained deviation from the child support guidelines, held that the trail court abused its discretion, despite the fact that the appellant failed to seek an articulation.
The wife in the case of Wallbeoff v. Wallbeoff, — A.2d —-, 113 Conn.App. 107, 2009 WL 564216 (Conn.App.), had been ordered by Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, to pay alimony and child support to the husband. However, as both parties agreed, the child support award deviated from the amounts set forth in the statutory child support guidelines, and the trial court failed to clarify on the record the basis for that deviation as required by ' 46b-215a-3(a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
The wife appealed the award and the husband answered by arguing that the appellate court should decline to review the financial orders because the trial court did not state the basis for its award and the wife failed to fulfill her responsibility to create a reviewable record by moving for an articulation. The appellate court chose to decide the case, however, and found that the Superior Court abused its discretion by deviating from the child support guidelines without explaining the reasons for the deviation on the record. The court determined that the lack of a well-reasoned explanation in the record was unnecessary in this case because, although it agreed with the defendant that “our rules normally place the burden of moving for an articulation on the appellant” should such clarification be necessary, it was obvious here that the lower court had failed in its duty to comply with the requirements of ' 46b-215a-3(a). Because the record was clear and unambiguous as to the absence of the required findings, the record was adequate for the appellate court's review of the issue on appeal.
Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 Opt In
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Legal Possession: What Does It Mean?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
The Anti-Assignment Override Provisions
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?