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Loss of Consortium
A manufacturer had a post-sale duty to warn a user or employer of a product defect. Brown v. Crown Equipment Corp., 554 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2009).
On appellant forklift manufacturer's appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maine, the court certified two questions of Maine law to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) of Maine going to duty to warn and the appropriate reduction to be taken for a comparative negligence finding. The jury's award had been reduced due to the decedent's comparative negligence and a statutory cap on consortium damages payable to appellee widow. The certified questions were: 1) Does Maine law incorporate the rule of Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability ' 10 that a manufacturer has a duty to warn known but indirect purchasers where the product was not defective at the time of sale but a product hazard developed thereafter? 2) Under Maine law, how is a jury's dollar adjustment for comparative negligence to be applied where a portion of the original damages award is reduced pursuant to the statutory damage cap?
On the first question, the Maine SJC found the manufacturer had a post-sale duty to warn the decedent or his employer. However, it did not locate such a duty in the Restatement, but held that the facts permitted recovery under a straightforward negligence theory. Its response to the second question called for a modest undisputed alteration in the damages calculation. In light of the Maine SJC's response on the liability issue, the manufacturer requested remand to provide it with a new trial. Remanding only for a modification in the damages award, the court noted that the dominant issue on the manufacturer's appeal ' whether a duty to warn existed ' was properly addressed by the Maine SJC in the widow's favor. The court upheld the jury's verdict and remanded only so that the district court could modify its damages award so that it comported with the Maine SJC's ruling.
Loss of Consortium
A manufacturer had a post-sale duty to warn a user or employer of a product defect.
On appellant forklift manufacturer's appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maine, the court certified two questions of Maine law to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) of Maine going to duty to warn and the appropriate reduction to be taken for a comparative negligence finding. The jury's award had been reduced due to the decedent's comparative negligence and a statutory cap on consortium damages payable to appellee widow. The certified questions were: 1) Does Maine law incorporate the rule of Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability ' 10 that a manufacturer has a duty to warn known but indirect purchasers where the product was not defective at the time of sale but a product hazard developed thereafter? 2) Under Maine law, how is a jury's dollar adjustment for comparative negligence to be applied where a portion of the original damages award is reduced pursuant to the statutory damage cap?
On the first question, the Maine SJC found the manufacturer had a post-sale duty to warn the decedent or his employer. However, it did not locate such a duty in the Restatement, but held that the facts permitted recovery under a straightforward negligence theory. Its response to the second question called for a modest undisputed alteration in the damages calculation. In light of the Maine SJC's response on the liability issue, the manufacturer requested remand to provide it with a new trial. Remanding only for a modification in the damages award, the court noted that the dominant issue on the manufacturer's appeal ' whether a duty to warn existed ' was properly addressed by the Maine SJC in the widow's favor. The court upheld the jury's verdict and remanded only so that the district court could modify its damages award so that it comported with the Maine SJC's ruling.
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