NJ & CT News

NEW JERSEY

Domestic Violence Prevention Law Not Unconstitutional

The New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, enacted almost 20 years ago, loosened the standards for proving, justifying arrest for, and restricting bail in cases of domestic violence. The Act was recently challenged and found unconstitutional by a Hudson County judge in a case involving a man whose wife had obtained a permanent injunction against him. In a June ruling by the Appellate Division, that decision was overturned, and the permanent injunction reinstated. Crespo v. Crespo, A-0202/0203-08. The appellate court found the preponderance standard for proving that domestic violence occurred was not unduly light, and it did not deprive the accused of his constitutional due process rights. The court noted that in enacting the law, the State legislature had weighed the interests of both parties in cases of accused domestic violence ' the alleged victim's right to be free from fear and danger vs. the alleged batterer's right to do and say what he or she pleases ' and had determined that the victim's interests trumped those of the perpetrator. This public policy in favor of domestic violence victims also favors the use of the preponderance standard, without which many victims deserving of help from the courts would be unable to prove their cases.

Supreme Court Clarifies Child Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations

In a suit brought by an adult allegedly sexually abused as a child, New Jersey's Supreme Court has clarified the correct application of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff in R.L. v. Voytac, A-61-08, filed suit against his stepfather in 2004 for abuse he allegedly endured from 1987 to 1990, when he was 10 to 12 years old. New Jersey's Child Sexual Abuse Act says an action must be filed within two years after “the reasonable discovery of the injury and its casual relationship to the act of sexual abuse,” but the limitations period may be tolled because of the plaintiff's “mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds.” The trial court dismissed the case, interpreting the statute to require suit to be filed within two years of the last act, or by 1992. Reading the Act to require that suit be filed within two years of the time the plaintiff appreciates that the abuse caused his emotional injuries, the Appellate Division reversed. (That court based its decision on the theory that, until undergoing psychotherapy in 2002, the plaintiff was unaware of what was troubling him.) On appeal, the State Supreme Court set out a two-pronged inquiry for determining timeliness. “We conclude that pursuant to the Act, the trial court must first determine when a reasonable person subjected to childhood abuse would discover that the defendant's conduct caused him or her injury. That is an objective test,” wrote Justice John Wallace Jr. “If that period is more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the court must next determine whether the statute should be tolled because of 'the mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds.'” The case was remanded so that this inquiry could be accomplished, but the case has been assigned to a different trial judge.

CONNECTICUT

Confidentiality Enforced Despite Language in
Separation Agreement

In June, the Supreme Court of Connecticut was faced with the question of whether a separation agreement that recited that it superseded any prior agreements nullified a prior confidentiality agreement. The court ruled that it did not.

The parties in Perricone v. Perricone, — A.2d —-, 2009 WL 1661279 (Conn., 6/23/09), initiated their divorce action in September 2003. In November 2003, they entered into a confidentiality agreement pertaining to the production of discovery material and dissemination “of any information related to this litigation or ' obtained during pretrial discovery ' .” The confidentiality agreement provided that both parties “fully understand that the plaintiff and his business interests may be severely harmed by the public dissemination of defamatory or disparaging information related to the parties. Accordingly, neither [of] the parties ' shall disseminate or cause to be disseminated to the public and the press any such disparaging or defamatory information.”

The 2004 judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties' written separation agreement, which provided that “it is the intention and desire of the parties that there be a complete, final and effective settlement of their respective rights and holdings” and that “[t]he [plaintiff] and [the defendant] have incorporated in this
[a]greement their entire understanding and no oral statement or prior written matter extrinsic to this [a]greement shall have any force or effect ' . This [a]greement supersedes any and all prior agreements between the [plaintiff] and [the defendant].”

In 2005, the plaintiff husband sought a restraining order after he learned that his ex-wife was contemplating discussing their marriage and their pending custody action on national television. In granting the restraining order, the trial court concluded that the separation agreement did not supersede and nullify the confidentiality agreement because the separation agreement and the confidentiality agreement “covered two distinct areas of the parties' rights and interests.” The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed because the subject matter of the separation agreement was the “division of property between the parties, while the subject matter of the confidentiality agreement was the disclosure of information concerning the parties' property and the parties themselves.”

NEW JERSEY

Domestic Violence Prevention Law Not Unconstitutional

The New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, enacted almost 20 years ago, loosened the standards for proving, justifying arrest for, and restricting bail in cases of domestic violence. The Act was recently challenged and found unconstitutional by a Hudson County judge in a case involving a man whose wife had obtained a permanent injunction against him. In a June ruling by the Appellate Division, that decision was overturned, and the permanent injunction reinstated. Crespo v. Crespo, A-0202/0203-08. The appellate court found the preponderance standard for proving that domestic violence occurred was not unduly light, and it did not deprive the accused of his constitutional due process rights. The court noted that in enacting the law, the State legislature had weighed the interests of both parties in cases of accused domestic violence ' the alleged victim's right to be free from fear and danger vs. the alleged batterer's right to do and say what he or she pleases ' and had determined that the victim's interests trumped those of the perpetrator. This public policy in favor of domestic violence victims also favors the use of the preponderance standard, without which many victims deserving of help from the courts would be unable to prove their cases.

Supreme Court Clarifies Child Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations

In a suit brought by an adult allegedly sexually abused as a child, New Jersey's Supreme Court has clarified the correct application of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff in R.L. v. Voytac, A-61-08, filed suit against his stepfather in 2004 for abuse he allegedly endured from 1987 to 1990, when he was 10 to 12 years old. New Jersey's Child Sexual Abuse Act says an action must be filed within two years after “the reasonable discovery of the injury and its casual relationship to the act of sexual abuse,” but the limitations period may be tolled because of the plaintiff's “mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds.” The trial court dismissed the case, interpreting the statute to require suit to be filed within two years of the last act, or by 1992. Reading the Act to require that suit be filed within two years of the time the plaintiff appreciates that the abuse caused his emotional injuries, the Appellate Division reversed. (That court based its decision on the theory that, until undergoing psychotherapy in 2002, the plaintiff was unaware of what was troubling him.) On appeal, the State Supreme Court set out a two-pronged inquiry for determining timeliness. “We conclude that pursuant to the Act, the trial court must first determine when a reasonable person subjected to childhood abuse would discover that the defendant's conduct caused him or her injury. That is an objective test,” wrote Justice John Wallace Jr. “If that period is more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the court must next determine whether the statute should be tolled because of 'the mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds.'” The case was remanded so that this inquiry could be accomplished, but the case has been assigned to a different trial judge.

CONNECTICUT

Confidentiality Enforced Despite Language in
Separation Agreement

In June, the Supreme Court of Connecticut was faced with the question of whether a separation agreement that recited that it superseded any prior agreements nullified a prior confidentiality agreement. The court ruled that it did not.

The parties in Perricone v. Perricone, — A.2d —-, 2009 WL 1661279 (Conn., 6/23/09), initiated their divorce action in September 2003. In November 2003, they entered into a confidentiality agreement pertaining to the production of discovery material and dissemination “of any information related to this litigation or ' obtained during pretrial discovery ' .” The confidentiality agreement provided that both parties “fully understand that the plaintiff and his business interests may be severely harmed by the public dissemination of defamatory or disparaging information related to the parties. Accordingly, neither [of] the parties ' shall disseminate or cause to be disseminated to the public and the press any such disparaging or defamatory information.”

The 2004 judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties' written separation agreement, which provided that “it is the intention and desire of the parties that there be a complete, final and effective settlement of their respective rights and holdings” and that “[t]he [plaintiff] and [the defendant] have incorporated in this
[a]greement their entire understanding and no oral statement or prior written matter extrinsic to this [a]greement shall have any force or effect ' . This [a]greement supersedes any and all prior agreements between the [plaintiff] and [the defendant].”

In 2005, the plaintiff husband sought a restraining order after he learned that his ex-wife was contemplating discussing their marriage and their pending custody action on national television. In granting the restraining order, the trial court concluded that the separation agreement did not supersede and nullify the confidentiality agreement because the separation agreement and the confidentiality agreement “covered two distinct areas of the parties' rights and interests.” The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed because the subject matter of the separation agreement was the “division of property between the parties, while the subject matter of the confidentiality agreement was the disclosure of information concerning the parties' property and the parties themselves.”