NJ & CT News

NEW JERSEY

Parental Alienation Suit Dismissed Because Trial Would Harm Children

In the case of Segal v. Lynch, — A.2d —-, 2010 WL 1740483, N.J.Super.A.D., 5/3/10 (NO. A-0805-08T2), a New Jersey appellate court recently held that although a father's tort suit seeking damages for parental alienation was not barred by the “Heart Balm Act,” the case could not go forward. The reason: A hearing on the issues and on damages would harm the minor children he claimed had been alienated from him by their mother. The court noted that it was faced here with two profound public policy implications raised by either permitting or denying such a cause of action; each option would protect one legal principle (the right to recover from a tortfeasor) at the expense of the other (the need to protect the best interests of the children). Liability could be established only if the plaintiff could show that the defendant's outrageous and malicious acts had interfered with the good relationship he would otherwise have had with his children. If liability could be proven, the children's testimony would be required to establish damages.

The lower court had dismissed the suit after concluding that it was barred by New Jersey's Heart Balm Act, which bars suit for torts that interfere with marriage, such as alienation of affection and breach of promise to marry. As this suit did not involve the marriage contract, the appellate court found the Heart Balm Act inapplicable. However, because subjecting the minor children to the type of examination that would be required here would not be in their best interests, the appellate court dismissed the case. It did not, however, affirm the trial court's imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff for bringing a frivolous lawsuit, as he had presented good-faith arguments in support of a novel interpretation of the law.

CONNECTICUT

Appellate Court Affirms Stalking Conviction

While still married to the woman he would be divorced from in November 2007, defendant Brent M. Arthurs was ordered, under four separate protective orders, to stay away from his wife. He didn't, and he took his case to the Appellate Court of Connecticut after his convictions for stalking and violating a protective order. State v. Arthurs, — A.2d —-, 2010 WL 2178944 (Conn.App., 6/8/10).

On June 3, 2007, the defendant went to his wife's home, where he yelled at her, pounded on her front and back doors, threatened to break things, punctured holes in the walls and broke down the door of the bedroom in which she was hiding. The victim obtained an order of protection that same month. After the protective order was issued, the defendant went to a triathlon event that he knew his wife often attended. When she saw him she became afraid and left the event, driving to a church that she had sometimes attended with the defendant, and where she and the defendant had received marriage counseling. She parked in a remote lot and took a shuttle to the church. When she approached the church's entrance she again saw the defendant, who was hiding against a wall and watching her. When she entered the church, he also entered. The victim soon left the church and called the police.

The defendant was convicted of stalking in the first degree in violation of Connecticut's General Statutes ' 53a-181c. On appeal, he claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the prosecution had not proven three elements of the crime, namely that: 1) he intended to cause the victim to fear for her physical safety; 2) he followed or lay in wait for the victim; and 3) the victim's fear for her physical safety was reasonable under the circumstances. The appellate court found as to the element of intent that “[t]he evidence adduced at trial, including the victim's account of the domestic dispute that took place on June 3, 2007, the defendant's disregard of the protective order issued against him and the defendant's 'creepy' behavior at the triathlon and [the church], was sufficient for the court to conclude that the defendant intended to cause the victim to fear for her physical safety.” The court found no reason to disturb the trial court's finding that the defendant had been guilty of “lying in wait,” as the lower court could reasonably have inferred that the defendant's presence at the triathlon and the church were prompted by his wife's presence there. And, finally, the victim had not only testified that she felt afraid, shaken and unsafe, but evidence was also introduced through the testimony of the police officer who responded to the June 3, 2007, home invasion from which the court could reasonably have concluded that the victim's fear on the day of the triathlon was objectively reasonable.

In his appeal of the conviction for violating a protective order, in accordance with General Statutes ' 53a-223 (a), the defendant argued that he was a member of the church at which the victim saw him (and that she was not a member) and that his presence at the church was accidental. He therefore claimed that the state had failed to prove he possessed the requisite mens rea for the crime. The appellate court noted, however, that evidence is not insufficient merely because it is conflicting (see State v. Russell, 101 Conn.App. 298, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910 (2007)) and the trial court “was free to reject [the] evidence and the chance encounter theory put forward by the defendant” in favor of the theory that he had gone to the church specifically to follow his wife.

NEW JERSEY

Parental Alienation Suit Dismissed Because Trial Would Harm Children

In the case of Segal v. Lynch, — A.2d —-, 2010 WL 1740483, N.J.Super.A.D., 5/3/10 (NO. A-0805-08T2), a New Jersey appellate court recently held that although a father's tort suit seeking damages for parental alienation was not barred by the “Heart Balm Act,” the case could not go forward. The reason: A hearing on the issues and on damages would harm the minor children he claimed had been alienated from him by their mother. The court noted that it was faced here with two profound public policy implications raised by either permitting or denying such a cause of action; each option would protect one legal principle (the right to recover from a tortfeasor) at the expense of the other (the need to protect the best interests of the children). Liability could be established only if the plaintiff could show that the defendant's outrageous and malicious acts had interfered with the good relationship he would otherwise have had with his children. If liability could be proven, the children's testimony would be required to establish damages.

The lower court had dismissed the suit after concluding that it was barred by New Jersey's Heart Balm Act, which bars suit for torts that interfere with marriage, such as alienation of affection and breach of promise to marry. As this suit did not involve the marriage contract, the appellate court found the Heart Balm Act inapplicable. However, because subjecting the minor children to the type of examination that would be required here would not be in their best interests, the appellate court dismissed the case. It did not, however, affirm the trial court's imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff for bringing a frivolous lawsuit, as he had presented good-faith arguments in support of a novel interpretation of the law.

CONNECTICUT

Appellate Court Affirms Stalking Conviction

While still married to the woman he would be divorced from in November 2007, defendant Brent M. Arthurs was ordered, under four separate protective orders, to stay away from his wife. He didn't, and he took his case to the Appellate Court of Connecticut after his convictions for stalking and violating a protective order. State v. Arthurs, — A.2d —-, 2010 WL 2178944 (Conn.App., 6/8/10).

On June 3, 2007, the defendant went to his wife's home, where he yelled at her, pounded on her front and back doors, threatened to break things, punctured holes in the walls and broke down the door of the bedroom in which she was hiding. The victim obtained an order of protection that same month. After the protective order was issued, the defendant went to a triathlon event that he knew his wife often attended. When she saw him she became afraid and left the event, driving to a church that she had sometimes attended with the defendant, and where she and the defendant had received marriage counseling. She parked in a remote lot and took a shuttle to the church. When she approached the church's entrance she again saw the defendant, who was hiding against a wall and watching her. When she entered the church, he also entered. The victim soon left the church and called the police.

The defendant was convicted of stalking in the first degree in violation of Connecticut's General Statutes ' 53a-181c. On appeal, he claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the prosecution had not proven three elements of the crime, namely that: 1) he intended to cause the victim to fear for her physical safety; 2) he followed or lay in wait for the victim; and 3) the victim's fear for her physical safety was reasonable under the circumstances. The appellate court found as to the element of intent that “[t]he evidence adduced at trial, including the victim's account of the domestic dispute that took place on June 3, 2007, the defendant's disregard of the protective order issued against him and the defendant's 'creepy' behavior at the triathlon and [the church], was sufficient for the court to conclude that the defendant intended to cause the victim to fear for her physical safety.” The court found no reason to disturb the trial court's finding that the defendant had been guilty of “lying in wait,” as the lower court could reasonably have inferred that the defendant's presence at the triathlon and the church were prompted by his wife's presence there. And, finally, the victim had not only testified that she felt afraid, shaken and unsafe, but evidence was also introduced through the testimony of the police officer who responded to the June 3, 2007, home invasion from which the court could reasonably have concluded that the victim's fear on the day of the triathlon was objectively reasonable.

In his appeal of the conviction for violating a protective order, in accordance with General Statutes ' 53a-223 (a), the defendant argued that he was a member of the church at which the victim saw him (and that she was not a member) and that his presence at the church was accidental. He therefore claimed that the state had failed to prove he possessed the requisite mens rea for the crime. The appellate court noted, however, that evidence is not insufficient merely because it is conflicting ( see State v. Russell , 101 Conn.App. 298, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910 (2007)) and the trial court “was free to reject [the] evidence and the chance encounter theory put forward by the defendant” in favor of the theory that he had gone to the church specifically to follow his wife.