NJ & CT News

CONNECTICUT

Order Constituted Impermissible Post-Judgment Modification

In Stechel v. Foster, 125 Conn.App. 441 (12/7/10), the Appellate Court of Connecticut recently held that Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, overstepped its bounds when it modified the distribution of a couple's property post-judgment.

As part of the couple's settlement agreement, the defendant wife was to transfer to the plaintiff, pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), her interest in a pension plan. The Superior Court noted at that time that “between both of the parties it is understood that there should be, absent fluctuations, approximately $734,000 in [the] QDRO.” The wife later refused to sign the QDRO, prompting the plaintiff to file a motion to enjoin. At the hearing, the husband claimed that pursuant to the terms of the judgment, he was entitled to a fixed sum of $734,000 to be paid out of the QDRO, while the defendant wife argued that, due to the declining economy, the value of the pension fund was now only $605,000. This amount, she argued, was all that the plaintiff was entitled to. The court granted the motion to enjoin and ordered the wife to sign the QDRO and make up the loss to the fund attributable to the decline in the economy from the sale of other assets. She appealed, claiming the order was improper because it was a post-judgment modification of the court's judgment of dissolution. The Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed, finding that the lower court's original order was for transfer of the assets in the QDRO; the judge's statement at that time that its value was approximately $734,000 was merely explanatory and did not constitute an award of that exact amount. “Therefore,” said the appellate court, “by ordering that the defendant sell assets to pay any deficiency between the amount in the QDRO and the sum of $734,000, the second order had the practical effect of altering the original property distribution from an award of the QDRO to an award of a fixed sum to be paid out of the funds in the QDRO as well as the sale of assets.” As such, the second order was an improper post-judgment modification of the original distribution of the marital property and it could not stand.

NEW JERSEY

With No Gripe from Parties, Judge Should Not Have Capped Attorney Fees

A New Jersey appeals court has ruled that Essex County Superior Court Judge Thomas Zampino stepped over the line when, sua sponte, he declared that attorneys handling a divorce matter would be limited to $50,000 each in attorney fees. The trial judge remarked that the fees the attorneys actually wanted to charge ' $148,606 for the plaintiff and $81,394 for the defendant ' were “shocking” for such a “cut and dry” case. In reversing on this issue, the Appellate Division stated in McClutchy v. McClutchy, A-5951-08: “When a court enters judgment on a matter not properly before it, the judgments are not merely erroneous: they would be absolutely void; because the court in rendering them would transcend the limits of authority in those cases.”

CONNECTICUT

Order Constituted Impermissible Post-Judgment Modification

In Stechel v. Foster , 125 Conn.App. 441 (12/7/10), the Appellate Court of Connecticut recently held that Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, overstepped its bounds when it modified the distribution of a couple's property post-judgment.

As part of the couple's settlement agreement, the defendant wife was to transfer to the plaintiff, pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), her interest in a pension plan. The Superior Court noted at that time that “between both of the parties it is understood that there should be, absent fluctuations, approximately $734,000 in [the] QDRO.” The wife later refused to sign the QDRO, prompting the plaintiff to file a motion to enjoin. At the hearing, the husband claimed that pursuant to the terms of the judgment, he was entitled to a fixed sum of $734,000 to be paid out of the QDRO, while the defendant wife argued that, due to the declining economy, the value of the pension fund was now only $605,000. This amount, she argued, was all that the plaintiff was entitled to. The court granted the motion to enjoin and ordered the wife to sign the QDRO and make up the loss to the fund attributable to the decline in the economy from the sale of other assets. She appealed, claiming the order was improper because it was a post-judgment modification of the court's judgment of dissolution. The Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed, finding that the lower court's original order was for transfer of the assets in the QDRO; the judge's statement at that time that its value was approximately $734,000 was merely explanatory and did not constitute an award of that exact amount. “Therefore,” said the appellate court, “by ordering that the defendant sell assets to pay any deficiency between the amount in the QDRO and the sum of $734,000, the second order had the practical effect of altering the original property distribution from an award of the QDRO to an award of a fixed sum to be paid out of the funds in the QDRO as well as the sale of assets.” As such, the second order was an improper post-judgment modification of the original distribution of the marital property and it could not stand.

NEW JERSEY

With No Gripe from Parties, Judge Should Not Have Capped Attorney Fees

A New Jersey appeals court has ruled that Essex County Superior Court Judge Thomas Zampino stepped over the line when, sua sponte, he declared that attorneys handling a divorce matter would be limited to $50,000 each in attorney fees. The trial judge remarked that the fees the attorneys actually wanted to charge ' $148,606 for the plaintiff and $81,394 for the defendant ' were “shocking” for such a “cut and dry” case. In reversing on this issue, the Appellate Division stated in McClutchy v. McClutchy, A-5951-08: “When a court enters judgment on a matter not properly before it, the judgments are not merely erroneous: they would be absolutely void; because the court in rendering them would transcend the limits of authority in those cases.”