NJ & CT News

NEW JERSEY

Proposed Legislation Would Give Stalking Victims New Civil Cause of Action

On June 13, Assemblyman Peter Barnes III, D-Middlesex, introduced a bill aimed at creating a civil cause of action for victims of stalking, as it is defined in New Jersey Statutes Annotated (N.J.S.A.) 2C:12-10. The right to collect civil damages in accordance with the proposed legislation would not be dependent on a stalker's being criminally charged or convicted, and punitive and compensatory damages would be recoverable, as well as attorney fees. The civil remedy, if passed, will put New Jersey in line with a growing trend to empower those victimized by stalkers; California, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia and Wyoming have already adopted similar legislation. Assemblyman Barnes noted that the proposed legislation would give victims a better means to seek redress than the current scheme, in which victims are limited to alleging common law harassment, assault or false imprisonment. Those claims do not permit the accuser to seek attorney fees. If the legislation passes, the attorney fee provision presumably will encourage lawyers to take on the representation of stalking victims who might otherwise not have the means to seek redress from their tormentors.

Artificial Insemination Participants May Not Contract Concerning Parental Status

The Chancery Division, Atlantic County, has held in a case of first impression that a woman who artificially inseminated herself with her friend's sperm cannot, under New Jersey law, relieve him of his parental rights and obligations by executing a contract with him to that effect. The parties in E.E. v. O.M.G.R., FD 01-1112-11, agreed that the man would provide his sperm to the woman and she would take full responsibility for raising and providing for the child. The woman became pregnant after she inseminated herself with a turkey baster. Following conception, the parties signed and had notarized a contract absolving the man of all duties toward the child. When the child was born, no father was listed on the birth certificate. Soon after the birth the parties signed a consent order, again stating that the man had no parental rights or responsibilities regarding the child. They submitted the consent order to the court but the court refused to accept it, finding that there is no common-law right to contractually dispense with parental rights and obligations. Termination of parental duties can be accomplished in New Jersey only in accordance with statutory law ' if the Division of Youth and Family Services has removed a child from a parent, if the parent is declared unfit, or if a third party agrees to adopt the child. None of these circumstances occurred in this case. In addition, in enacting the New Jersey Artificial Insemination Statute, the court determined the legislature showed no intent to permit an artificial insemination procedure to lead to the termination of parental rights unless all of the provisions of the statute were followed. One such provision requires a physician to impregnate the woman with the donated sperm; the court reasoned that if the legislature did not want this to be a requirement for a sperm donor to be relieved of parental rights and obligations it would have eliminated that provision, as other states have done.

Judge Reprimanded for Ranting at Pro Se Litigant

Former Atlantic County presiding family judge Max Baker was reprimanded on June 16 for yelling at a pro se litigant who questioned a court-imposed child-visitation schedule. The reprimand followed Baker's acceptance of the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee of Judicial Conduct in the case against him, In the Matter of Max A. Baker, 2010-151. The Committee had found Baker erred when he yelled what they termed “repugnant and offensive” comments at the parent, who was appearing pro se, in a “hostile, angry and antagonistic” tone. Instead of giving the litigant the opportunity to explain her objections to the judge's visitation plan, the Committee found that he questioned her in a “callous and denigrating” way, and implied that he would have her jailed if she did not cooperate.

CONNECTICUT

Court Did Not Err in Excluding Expert Testimony in Child Molestation Case

The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man for sexually molesting his stepson over a period of years, although the trial court had declined to admit the testimony of a defense expert. The expert at issue in State of Connecticut v. Victor O., 301 Conn. 163 (Conn. 6/7/11), would have testified that he gave a test to the defendant (the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest test) that showed the defendant did not have a sexual interest in men or boys. The State Supreme Court upheld the exclusion, finding that the facts the Abel test has an error rate of approximately 20%, that it relies on self-reporting by the test-taker, and that the scientific community questions whether it is a viable screening tool as well as a treatment tool, meant the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony.

NEW JERSEY

Proposed Legislation Would Give Stalking Victims New Civil Cause of Action

On June 13, Assemblyman Peter Barnes III, D-Middlesex, introduced a bill aimed at creating a civil cause of action for victims of stalking, as it is defined in New Jersey Statutes Annotated (N.J.S.A.) 2C:12-10. The right to collect civil damages in accordance with the proposed legislation would not be dependent on a stalker's being criminally charged or convicted, and punitive and compensatory damages would be recoverable, as well as attorney fees. The civil remedy, if passed, will put New Jersey in line with a growing trend to empower those victimized by stalkers; California, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia and Wyoming have already adopted similar legislation. Assemblyman Barnes noted that the proposed legislation would give victims a better means to seek redress than the current scheme, in which victims are limited to alleging common law harassment, assault or false imprisonment. Those claims do not permit the accuser to seek attorney fees. If the legislation passes, the attorney fee provision presumably will encourage lawyers to take on the representation of stalking victims who might otherwise not have the means to seek redress from their tormentors.

Artificial Insemination Participants May Not Contract Concerning Parental Status

The Chancery Division, Atlantic County, has held in a case of first impression that a woman who artificially inseminated herself with her friend's sperm cannot, under New Jersey law, relieve him of his parental rights and obligations by executing a contract with him to that effect. The parties in E.E. v. O.M.G.R., FD 01-1112-11, agreed that the man would provide his sperm to the woman and she would take full responsibility for raising and providing for the child. The woman became pregnant after she inseminated herself with a turkey baster. Following conception, the parties signed and had notarized a contract absolving the man of all duties toward the child. When the child was born, no father was listed on the birth certificate. Soon after the birth the parties signed a consent order, again stating that the man had no parental rights or responsibilities regarding the child. They submitted the consent order to the court but the court refused to accept it, finding that there is no common-law right to contractually dispense with parental rights and obligations. Termination of parental duties can be accomplished in New Jersey only in accordance with statutory law ' if the Division of Youth and Family Services has removed a child from a parent, if the parent is declared unfit, or if a third party agrees to adopt the child. None of these circumstances occurred in this case. In addition, in enacting the New Jersey Artificial Insemination Statute, the court determined the legislature showed no intent to permit an artificial insemination procedure to lead to the termination of parental rights unless all of the provisions of the statute were followed. One such provision requires a physician to impregnate the woman with the donated sperm; the court reasoned that if the legislature did not want this to be a requirement for a sperm donor to be relieved of parental rights and obligations it would have eliminated that provision, as other states have done.

Judge Reprimanded for Ranting at Pro Se Litigant

Former Atlantic County presiding family judge Max Baker was reprimanded on June 16 for yelling at a pro se litigant who questioned a court-imposed child-visitation schedule. The reprimand followed Baker's acceptance of the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee of Judicial Conduct in the case against him, In the Matter of Max A. Baker, 2010-151. The Committee had found Baker erred when he yelled what they termed “repugnant and offensive” comments at the parent, who was appearing pro se, in a “hostile, angry and antagonistic” tone. Instead of giving the litigant the opportunity to explain her objections to the judge's visitation plan, the Committee found that he questioned her in a “callous and denigrating” way, and implied that he would have her jailed if she did not cooperate.

CONNECTICUT

Court Did Not Err in Excluding Expert Testimony in Child Molestation Case

The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man for sexually molesting his stepson over a period of years, although the trial court had declined to admit the testimony of a defense expert. The expert at issue in State of Connecticut v. Victor O. , 301 Conn. 163 (Conn. 6/7/11), would have testified that he gave a test to the defendant (the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest test) that showed the defendant did not have a sexual interest in men or boys. The State Supreme Court upheld the exclusion, finding that the facts the Abel test has an error rate of approximately 20%, that it relies on self-reporting by the test-taker, and that the scientific community questions whether it is a viable screening tool as well as a treatment tool, meant the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony.