NJ & CT News

NEW JERSEY

Move to Gay-Unfriendly State Allowed Despite Parent's Fear of Discriminatory Treatment

Superior Court judge Mary Thurber, in A.G. v. R.R., BER-FM-02-2258-09, has held that a man may move with his adopted child to Georgia over the objections of his former same-sex partner and co-adoptive parent. The case is significant because the court was asked to decide not only if the move was in the child's best interests, but also whether the legal and social climate of Georgia concerning recognition of same-sex parties' rights should play a role in the decision. The case involved parties Anthony Galde and Richard Rinko, who were never married and did not enter into a formal legal partnership, yet adopted a child together in New Jersey in 2004. They eventually separated and, in accordance with an agreement between them, Galde was permitted to move with the child to New York, where Galde worked as a performer in a Broadway show. Unfortunately, Galde was injured during a performance and became unable to continue his career on the stage. He was offered a position in Atlanta with a television production company, and sought court permission to move his son there with him. Rinko objected to the move, in part because Georgia is a state that is unfriendly to gay rights, as evidenced by the facts that it does not permit same-sex marriage and its constitution prohibits the recognition of such unions legally entered into in other jurisdictions.

While no Georgia law prohibits same-sex adoption, and no court there has yet been asked to decide whether same-sex couples may adopt, a July 11 Georgia appeals court did say, in Bates v. Bates, that it is “doubtful” that Georgia law recognizes second-parent adoptions. After determining that New Jersey has an interest in seeing its orders upheld and would retain jurisdiction over the matter ' thus ensuring that New Jersey's public policy considerations would prevail over Georgia's ' the court allowed the move. Stated the court, if Rinko's “worst fears are realized, and if the state of Georgia is hostile to his parental rights, he has a judicial remedy” in New Jersey.

CONNECTICUT

Divorce-Related Complaints Not Cognizable in Vexatious Litigation Action

A woman who sought redress in a vexatious litigation action for a laundry list of wrongs done to her by her ex-husband before, during and after their divorce was disappointed when the Appellate Court of Connecticut upheld an award of damages based only on the spurious motion he filed against her, on which she had based her claim. Spilke v. Wicklow, 2012 Conn. App. LEXIS 429 (9/25/12). After the couple's divorce, the husband moved the court to find her in contempt of one of its divorce-related orders. The wife prevailed, then brought a vexatious litigation suit against him. Her complaint went unanswered, so a default judgment against the husband was entered. The court set damages at $30,000, representing $10,000 in emotional damages that were trebled by the court. The ex-wife appealed, being unhappy with the low damage amount; she claimed that the contempt accusation against her was simply one more aspect of the husband's reprehensible behavior throughout the divorce proceedings. This, she claimed, included his hiding assets from her, and she further alleged that the contempt action was brought against her to aid in his attempt to conceal those assets. The Appellate Court of Connecticut found no error, agreeing with the trial court that a vexatious litigation claim arises when a plaintiff has wrongfully been sued.

“In the present case,” stated the court, “the wrongful lawsuit at issue was the filing of the motion for contempt. Although the divorce between the plaintiff and [the ex-husband] may have been acrimonious, the plaintiff's vexatious litigation claim stems from the filing of the motion of contempt, and not from the divorce proceedings. The alleged concealment of assets and fraudulent financial affidavits happened prior to the filing of the motion for contempt and are not relevant to the plaintiff's damages for her vexatious litigation claim.” Thus, the appellate court concluded, the wife could not now assert that the vexatious litigation claim stemmed from more than just the act of filing a contempt motion; that is what she claimed in her suit, and the trial court correctly limited its review to damages arising out of the filing of the motion for contempt alone.

NEW JERSEY

Move to Gay-Unfriendly State Allowed Despite Parent's Fear of Discriminatory Treatment

Superior Court judge Mary Thurber, in A.G. v. R.R., BER-FM-02-2258-09, has held that a man may move with his adopted child to Georgia over the objections of his former same-sex partner and co-adoptive parent. The case is significant because the court was asked to decide not only if the move was in the child's best interests, but also whether the legal and social climate of Georgia concerning recognition of same-sex parties' rights should play a role in the decision. The case involved parties Anthony Galde and Richard Rinko, who were never married and did not enter into a formal legal partnership, yet adopted a child together in New Jersey in 2004. They eventually separated and, in accordance with an agreement between them, Galde was permitted to move with the child to New York, where Galde worked as a performer in a Broadway show. Unfortunately, Galde was injured during a performance and became unable to continue his career on the stage. He was offered a position in Atlanta with a television production company, and sought court permission to move his son there with him. Rinko objected to the move, in part because Georgia is a state that is unfriendly to gay rights, as evidenced by the facts that it does not permit same-sex marriage and its constitution prohibits the recognition of such unions legally entered into in other jurisdictions.

While no Georgia law prohibits same-sex adoption, and no court there has yet been asked to decide whether same-sex couples may adopt, a July 11 Georgia appeals court did say, in Bates v. Bates, that it is “doubtful” that Georgia law recognizes second-parent adoptions. After determining that New Jersey has an interest in seeing its orders upheld and would retain jurisdiction over the matter ' thus ensuring that New Jersey's public policy considerations would prevail over Georgia's ' the court allowed the move. Stated the court, if Rinko's “worst fears are realized, and if the state of Georgia is hostile to his parental rights, he has a judicial remedy” in New Jersey.

CONNECTICUT

Divorce-Related Complaints Not Cognizable in Vexatious Litigation Action

A woman who sought redress in a vexatious litigation action for a laundry list of wrongs done to her by her ex-husband before, during and after their divorce was disappointed when the Appellate Court of Connecticut upheld an award of damages based only on the spurious motion he filed against her, on which she had based her claim. Spilke v. Wicklow, 2012 Conn. App. LEXIS 429 (9/25/12). After the couple's divorce, the husband moved the court to find her in contempt of one of its divorce-related orders. The wife prevailed, then brought a vexatious litigation suit against him. Her complaint went unanswered, so a default judgment against the husband was entered. The court set damages at $30,000, representing $10,000 in emotional damages that were trebled by the court. The ex-wife appealed, being unhappy with the low damage amount; she claimed that the contempt accusation against her was simply one more aspect of the husband's reprehensible behavior throughout the divorce proceedings. This, she claimed, included his hiding assets from her, and she further alleged that the contempt action was brought against her to aid in his attempt to conceal those assets. The Appellate Court of Connecticut found no error, agreeing with the trial court that a vexatious litigation claim arises when a plaintiff has wrongfully been sued.

“In the present case,” stated the court, “the wrongful lawsuit at issue was the filing of the motion for contempt. Although the divorce between the plaintiff and [the ex-husband] may have been acrimonious, the plaintiff's vexatious litigation claim stems from the filing of the motion of contempt, and not from the divorce proceedings. The alleged concealment of assets and fraudulent financial affidavits happened prior to the filing of the motion for contempt and are not relevant to the plaintiff's damages for her vexatious litigation claim.” Thus, the appellate court concluded, the wife could not now assert that the vexatious litigation claim stemmed from more than just the act of filing a contempt motion; that is what she claimed in her suit, and the trial court correctly limited its review to damages arising out of the filing of the motion for contempt alone.