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It should be no surprise that the continuing growth of social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn has led to questions about its use by members of the legal community, including members of the judiciary. In fact, New York's Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics'has just issued Opinion 13-39, issued May 28, 2013, exploring the ethical constraints of social media use by judges, following one it issued in 2009 (Opinion 08-176, issued Jan. 29, 2009).
New York is not alone in tackling this subject. In February, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility offered a formal opinion entitled “Judge's Use of Electronic Social Networking Media,” Formal Opinion 462, issued Feb. 21, 2013, and the subject recently has been debated and analyzed in a variety of states across the country (more on this below).
One interesting aspect of the judiciary's use of social media that many of these various opinions have faced is the seemingly straightforward subject of whether a judge must recuse him- or herself in the event a lawyer whom the judge has “friended” shows up in the judge's courtroom. Of course, this issue has important practical implications. The different opinions, however, have reached different results, as this article discusses. It would appear that the more experience judges, lawyers and bar groups have with social media, the more comfortable they all may become with the way judges and lawyers use it.
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