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A California district court has denied cross summary judgment motions in a case that has implications for fair use analysis under copyright law and DMCA litigation. The motions arose out of a 2007 lawsuit between plaintiff Stephanie Lenz and defendant Universal Music Corp., concerning Lenz' use in a home video of the song “Let's Go Crazy” by the artist formerly known as Prince. Lenz v Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF (S.D. Cal 2013). (A PDF of the order is available at http://bit.ly/17DVJ7V.)
Dancing Toddler
Lenz had made a 29-second video showing her toddler dancing to Prince's “Let's Go Crazy.” Lenz had entitled it “Let's Go Crazy #1.” Universal, a music publishing company that administers the copyrights to the song, identified the video through its daily copyright review procedures and sent a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)'takedown notice to YouTube, which removed the video, giving Lenz an opportunity to respond. Lenz' first response was incomplete and the video remained offline. After Lenz retained counsel, she submitted a second DMCA counter-notice, asserting the video qualified as fair use. YouTube reposted the video approximately six weeks later. In 2007, Lenz sued Universal, alleging that she had suffered damages during the time that YouTube had removed her video in response to Universal's takedown notice. As of July 2013, the video had over 1.25 million hits, although presumably some of its popularity is due to Lenz' pending legal action.
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