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As 2015 drew to a close, Congress agreed on a federal budget for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2016. That simple act, coming on the heels of a series of contentious continuing resolutions, was big news. But tucked away on page 694 of that 887-page bill was perhaps a more significant achievement. There Congress inserted, passed, and the President signed, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the Act), H.R. 2029.
The Act is the culmination of years of efforts by members of both parties in both houses of Congress to provide a framework for the sharing of cyber threat information between private industry and the government. Industry counsel long pushed Congress for a means to share information without exposing their organizations to legal liability. That effort, however, was not without controversy. Privacy advocates and some in the technology industry viewed the effort as undermining protection of personal information (see, Sam Thielman, “Apple, Google and Twitter Among 22 Tech Companies Opposing CISA Bill,” The Guardian, Oct. 21, 2015) and, as one opponent said, “a disingenuous attempt to quietly expand the U.S. government's surveillance programs.” Statement of Fight for the Future campaign director Evan Greer.
The DOJ's Criminal Division issued three declinations since the issuance of the revised CEP a year ago. Review of these cases gives insight into DOJ's implementation of the new policy in practice.
The parameters set forth in the DOJ's memorandum have implications not only for the government's evaluation of compliance programs in the context of criminal charging decisions, but also for how defense counsel structure their conference-room advocacy seeking declinations or lesser sanctions in both criminal and civil investigations.
This article discusses the practical and policy reasons for the use of DPAs and NPAs in white-collar criminal investigations, and considers the NDAA's new reporting provision and its relationship with other efforts to enhance transparency in DOJ decision-making.
There is no efficient market for the sale of bankruptcy assets. Inefficient markets yield a transactional drag, potentially dampening the ability of debtors and trustees to maximize value for creditors. This article identifies ways in which investors may more easily discover bankruptcy asset sales.
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower courts' judgment that a "transfer made … in connection with a securities contract … by a qualifying financial institution" was entitled "to the protection of ... §546 (e)'s safe harbor ...."